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NO INDETERMINATE SENTENCING WITHOUT PAROLE 
KATHERINE PUZAUSKAS & KEVIN MORROW 
ABSTRACT 
This article looks critically at the indeterminate sentencing system that 
survived after the elimination of parole in Arizona in 1993.  It begins by 
exploring the purpose and history of indeterminate sentencing and parole 
as well as its earliest constitutional challenges and eventual decline.  Next it 
compares two commonly confused forms of “release”: parole and executive 
clemency.  The article then examines the three types of defendants affected 
by indeterminate sentences without parole: death row defendants denied 
parole eligibility instructions at trial, defendants sentenced with parole at 
trial, and defendants whose plea agreement includes parole.  Finally, the 
article argues that without parole, indeterminate sentencing systems like the 
one used in Arizona should be ruled unconstitutional. 
  
 
 Professor of Practice, Sandra Day O’Conner College of Law; former executive director of the Arizona 
Justice Project; J.D. Howard University. 
 J.D. Candidate, Sandra Day O’Conner College of Law, 2018. 
This article does not address Arizona Senate Bill 1211 (2018) which may permit parole eligibility for 
pleading inmates sentenced to life with the possibility of parole after a minimum number of years. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the early days of American criminal law, prisoners guilty of crimes 
received and served a fixed, determinate sentence.1  As the nation 
developed, sentence reformers introduced a new system where, generally, 
prisoners were sentenced to an indeterminate range of years or to “life.”2  
Then a parole board would select those prisoners who would be released 
once they had served the minimum term.3  In the past thirty years across the 
country, determinate sentencing has returned and the process of parole has 
been abolished in many states under the banner of “Truth-in-Sentencing.”4 
 
 1. Warren v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 659 F.2d 183, 189 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 2. Id. at 190. 
 3. See id. at 195-96 (noting that the punishment handed down by the court was service of a 
minimum term plus whatever additional term the parole board came up with). 
 4. See 1993 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1404 (explaining that the purpose of S.B. 1049 was “to promote 
truth and accountability in sentencing.”). 
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For states that chose to implement Truth-in-Sentencing by returning to 
determinate sentencing, this presents no issue.  However, if a state 
eliminates parole without altering the system of indeterminate sentencing, it 
creates a paradox; an indeterminate sentencing scheme is a system that 
requires parole.5  Parole is the hallmark of an indeterminate sentencing 
system.6  Parole determines the end of an indeterminate sentence; parole 
allows for “the state to be able to adjust the length of sentence so that a 
person will be supervised as long as he constitutes an unreasonable threat to 
life or property, but no longer.”7 
When Arizona implemented Truth-in-Sentencing on January 1, 1994, it 
eliminated parole for all offenses but did not eliminate indeterminate 
sentencing.8  A limited number of Arizona criminal statutes still mandate 
indeterminate life sentences, and although parole was eliminated, 
defendants routinely received, or pled to, sentences with parole eligibility.9 
The United States Supreme Court recently shed light on this situation in 
Lynch v. Arizona (Lynch III), which upheld the right of defendants eligible 
for the death penalty to inform the jury of their parole eligibility.10  The 
court sentenced Shawn Lynch under an Arizona statute that allows for 
natural life or an indeterminate sentence of life with the possibility of 
“release” after twenty-five years as alternatives to the death penalty.11  In 
Lynch III, the Court found that parole is not available for adult defendants in 
Arizona, despite over two hundred defendants whose sentences include 
parole eligibility.12  This creates a significant problem in Arizona’s 
sentencing structure; defendants are receiving sentences or pleading guilty 
to crimes with stipulated sentences of “life” with the possibility of parole 
after serving a minimum term of years.13  Otherwise unheard of in 
 
 5. See Jon Wool & Don Stemen, Aggravated Sentencing: Blakely v. Washington Practical 
Implications for State Sentencing Systems, 17 FED. SENT’G. REP. 60, 61 (2004) (defining “determinate 
sentencing” as “a system in which there is no discretionary releasing authority and an offender may be 
released from prison only after expiration of the sentence imposed (less available good or earned 
time).”). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Anderson v. Nelson, 352 F. Supp. 1124, 1129 (N.D. Cal. 1972). 
 8. See Lynch v. Arizona (Lynch III), 136 S. Ct. 1818 (2016) (noting that under Arizona law, 
“parole is only available for individuals who committed a felony before January 1, 1994. . . .”). 
 9. See generally 1993 Sess. Laws of Ariz. (many of the Arizona laws no longer mandate 
indeterminate life sentences). 
 10. Lynch III, 136 S. Ct. at 1820. 
 11. Id. at 1821-22 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(A)).  Arizona’s sentencing statutes 
permitting a sentence of natural life are not addressed by this article.  For a discussion of natural life 
sentences see Craig S. Lerner, Life Without Parole as a Conflicted Punishment, 48 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 1101, 1105 (2013); Danya W. Blair, A Matter of Life and Death: Why Life Without Parole Should 
Be a Sentencing Option in Texas, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 191, 199 (1994). 
 12. Lynch III, 136 S. Ct. at 1818. 
 13. Michael Kiefer, Hundreds in Arizona got Life with Parole, a Sentence Barred by Law. Did 
State Prisons Just Fix the Problem?, THE REPUBLIC (Mar. 30, 2017, 10:05 PM), 
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American criminal law, this system of indeterminate sentencing without 
parole has created three substantial issues that this paper will address: (1) 
capital defendants denied their due process right to inform the jury of their 
parole ineligibility under Lynch III are now entitled to a new jury 
sentencing; (2) defendants sentenced by the court to an indeterminate life 
sentence with the possibility of parole have a due process right to be heard 
by a parole board; and (3) defendants are able to withdraw from plea 
agreements that promised parole eligibility if the state is unable to provide 
the parole hearing or else demand specific performance on their pleas.14  
Considering these issues and the due process interest in a parole hearing, it 
seems clear that a system of laws that allows for defendants to serve 
indeterminate sentences without parole must be unconstitutional.15 
II. HISTORY OF INDETERMINATE SENTENCING AND PAROLE 
Parole and indeterminate sentencing arose as part of the prison reform 
movement led by Zebulon Brockway in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century.16  The movement aimed to shift the focus of prisons from the 
actions of a prisoner’s past, to the cure and prevention of crimes.17  
Rehabilitation replaced raw vengeance as the principal theoretical basis for 
imprisonment.18  A new sentencing structure with indeterminate sentences 
and parole became the most influential product of this movement.19  In an 
indeterminate sentencing structure, an administrative board decides the 
amount of time actually served while the prisoner is serving time, rather 
than a judge deciding the time the prisoner will serve at the time of 
sentencing.20  Indeterminate sentences have always included parole and 
there has never been a purely indeterminate sentencing scheme put into 
effect.21 
Brockway receives credit for the first application of indeterminate 
sentencing and parole, which he incorporated during his time as 
superintendent of the Detroit House of Corrections.22  “In 1869, Brockway 
 
https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/arizona-investigations/2017/03/31/arizona-department-
corrections-life-with-parole/99850694/. 
 14. See infra Part IV. 
 15. See infra Part V. 
 16. James J. Beha II, Redemption to Reform: The Intellectual Origins of the Prison Reform 
Movement, 63 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 773, 786 (2008). 
 17. Alan M. Dershowitz, Indeterminate Confinement: Letting the Therapy Fit the Harm, 123 U. 
PA. L. REV. 297, 311 (1974). 
 18. Warren, 659 F.2d at 189. 
 19. Beha, supra note 16, at 789. 
 20. Dershowitz, supra note 17, at 298. 
 21. See Edward Lindsey, Historical Sketch of the Indeterminate Sentence and Parole System, 16 
J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 9, 9 (1925). 
 22. Beha, supra note 16, at 789. 
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drafted, and the Michigan legislature enacted, the ‘three years law,’ which 
provided for a mandatory three-year sentence for ‘common prostitutes.’”23  
Those defendants would have the opportunity for conditional release subject 
to the “managing authorities of the house of correction.”24  “Brockway 
described this system as ‘the first attempted practical application in America 
of the profound principle of the indeterminate sentence system, which 
substitutes both in the laws and in prison practice reformatory in place of 
the usual punitive regime.’”25 
In 1870, the First National Prison Congress endorsed Brockway’s new 
system, declaring that “[p]eremptory sentences ought to be replaced by 
those of indeterminate duration; sentences limited only by satisfactory proof 
of reformation should be substituted for those measured by mere lapse of 
time.”26  The new indeterminate sentencing system also required a 
specialized bureaucracy to make decisions regarding early release upon the 
prisoner’s rehabilitation.27  This abandonment of proportionality rejected 
any retributive justification for punishment and allowed for a prisoner’s 
release immediately upon effective “cure,” regardless of the severity of the 
underlying crime.28 
In 1876, Brockway became superintendent of the new Elmira Prison in 
New York.29  Brockway turned Elmira into “the laboratory where the 
leaders of the movement toward reformatory rehabilitation put their 
scientific theories about crime into practical effect.”30  Under the Elmira 
system, the convict was sentenced to a statutory-maximum sentence, below 
which the time of imprisonment was up to the discretion of the managers of 
the Reformatory.31 
By 1900, Brockway’s parole system had been adopted in some form by 
twenty states.32  Territorial Arizona first offered parole in 1901.33  By 1925, 
parole systems could be found in all forty-eight states and in the federal 
system.34 
 
 23. Id. at 789-90. 
 24. Id. at 790. 
 25. Id. 
 26. TRANSACTIONS OF THE NATIONAL CONGRESS ON PENITENTIARY AND REFORMATORY 
DISCIPLINE 551 (E.C. Wines ed., 1871). 
 27. Beha, supra note 16, at 797. 
 28. Id. at 796. 
 29. Id. at 799. 
 30. Id. at 798. 
 31. Lindsey, supra note 21, at 22. 
 32. Id. at 40. 
 33. History of the Arizona Board of Executive Clemency, ARIZ. BOARD EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY, 
https://boec.az.gov/node/727 (last visited Oct. 30, 2016). 
 34. Beha, supra note 16, at 806. 
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The legal community also supported the new sentencing system.  
Charlton T. Lewis, Harvard Law lector and President of the Prison 
Association of New York, declared in an influential article that 
indeterminate sentencing was “the one right method of dealing with 
crime.”35  He wrote, 
[t]here are but two conceivable ways of protecting the community 
against its enemy, the criminal; to disarm him or to reconcile him.  
But the [determinative] sentence does neither.  It restrains him until 
the term ends, as if one should cage a man-eating tiger for a month 
or a year, and then turn him loose.  There is nothing in such a 
sentence which tends to reconcile him to his fellows.  It commonly 
aims at nothing more than to restrain him and hold him safely for 
the term, and in most cases he is discharged more the foe of 
mankind than before.36 
The courts have followed the view that the parole system serves the 
public-interest purposes of rehabilitation and deterrence.37  The courts 
describe the indeterminate sentencing scheme, which leaves the task of 
determining when it is safe to release an offender to the trained parole 
board, as one that keeps prisoners confined until they show themselves fit 
for membership in a free community.38  The courts have also found that 
“[t]hese laws place emphasis upon the reformation of the offender . . . 
[i]nstead of trying to break the will of the offender and make him 
submissive, the purpose is to strengthen his will to do right and lessen his 
temptation to do wrong.”39  Parole boards focus on the likelihood the 
prisoner will transgress again, the prisoner’s response to rehabilitative 
efforts to assist with a lawful future career, and the degree to which he does 
or does not deem himself at war with his society.40 
 
 35. Charlton T. Lewis, The Indeterminate Sentence, 9 YALE L. J. 17, 17 (1899). 
 36. Id. at 18. 
 37. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 8 (1979); see 
also Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 332 (2004) (explaining that “[u]nder indeterminate systems, 
the length of the sentence is entirely or almost entirely within the discretion of the judge or of the parole 
board, which typically has broad power to decide when to release a prisoner.”); United States v. 
Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 46 (1978) (explaining that “[a] fundamental proposal of [the prison reform 
movement] was a flexible sentencing system permitting judges and correctional personnel, particularly 
the latter, to set the release date of prisoners according to informed judgments concerning their potential 
for, or actual, rehabilitation and their likely recidivism.”); Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 
524 U.S. 357, 367 (1998) (explaining that “one of the purposes of parole is to reduce the costs of 
criminal punishment while maintaining a degree of supervision over the parolee.”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 
1–211(A) (2016) (directing statutes be construed consistently with the intent of the legislature). 
 38. Warren, 659 F.2d at 190. 
 39. Ex parte Lee, 171 P. 959 (Cal. 1918). 
 40. Grayson, 438 U.S. at 51. 
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Scholars and experts consistently agree that parole is essential to a 
system where prisoners are sentenced to a range of years and not a definite 
term.  In Commissioner Samuel Barrows’ 1899 report to the International 
Prison Commission, he believed “[t]he definite sentence deals wholly with a 
convict’s past . . . [and] [u]nder the indefinite sentence the attention of the 
prisoner and of the state is fixed upon the future.”41  Edwin Abbott, as 
Secretary of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, 
wrote in 1912, “[i]n some states a model prisoner is automatically entitled to 
parole upon the expiration of his minimum sentence; in other states no time 
is specified and it is entirely within the discretion of the parole board.”42  
Wilbur LaRoe, former chairman of the Board of Indeterminate Sentence and 
Parole of the District of Columbia, wrote an authoritative book on the parole 
systems of the United States in 1939.43  LaRoe describes indeterminate 
sentences where, “the sentencing judge shares with the board of parole 
responsibility for deciding the length of sentence, the court fixing the 
minimum and maximum, but the board determining at what precise point 
between the minimum and maximum the prisoner is ready for release.”44  
Professor Martin Gardner wrote in 1980 that the indeterminate sentence, in 
short, “‘describe[s] any prison sentence for which the precise term of 
confinement is not known on the day of judgment but will be subject within 
a substantial range to the later decision of a parole board or some 
comparable agency under whatever name.’”45  Criminologist Michael 
Tonry, noted in 1999 that the Bureau of Justice Assistance’s central 
distinction between determinate and indeterminate “systems was whether 
parole release remained available for a sizable fraction of cases.”46  No 
scholars or experts have considered a system of indeterminate sentencing 
without parole as a legal possibility. 
 
 41. WARREN SPALDING, THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE: ITS HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT IN 
THE UNITED STATES, in THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE AND THE PAROLE LAW: REPORTS PREPARED 
FOR THE INTERNATIONAL PRISON COMMISSION 7, 13 (Samuel Barrows ed., 1899). 
 42. See Edwin M. Abbott, Indeterminate Sentence and Release on Parole, 3 J. AM. INST. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 543, 546 (1913) (questioning whether indeterminate sentencing is a beneficial 
feature of the parole system). 
 43. See WILBUR LAROE, PAROLE WITH HONOR 187 (1939). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Martin R. Gardner, The Determinate Sentencing Movement and The Eighth Amendment: 
Excessive Punishment Before and After Rummel v. Estelle, 1980 DUKE L.J. 1103, 1103 n.1 (1980). 
 46. Michael Tonry, Reconsidering Indeterminate and Structured Sentencing, NAT’L INST. JUST., 
Sept. 1999, at 7-8. 
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A.  Early Judicial Challenges to Indeterminate Sentencing and Parole 
Systems 
The change from the judicially imposed determinative sentences to the 
new indeterminate sentences with parole boards did not happen without 
challenges.47  Brockway’s indeterminate sentences in Michigan did not last 
long.48  The Michigan Supreme Court held indeterminate sentences 
unconstitutional, reasoning that under the state constitution “[t]he Governor 
has the undoubted right to pardon.”49  The court further reasoned that “this 
parole system is as obnoxious to the Constitution as an unconditional 
release by the board would be; and, if they have the power to release on 
conditions, those conditions may be made so trifling as in fact to be no 
conditions at all.”50  Michigan subsequently amended its constitution in 
1901, which authorized the legislature to provide for indeterminate 
sentencing laws as punishment for crime, and the Michigan Supreme Court 
upheld the amendment.51  Other state courts similarly held the early 
indeterminate sentences and parole unconstitutional.52 
In 1902, the Supreme Court of the United States upheld indeterminate 
sentencing and parole.53  In Dreyer v. Illinois, the indeterminate sentencing 
statute in the State of Illinois was challenged for conferring “judicial powers 
upon a collection of persons who do not belong to the judicial department, 
and, in effect, invests them with the pardoning power committed by the 
constitution to the Governor of the State.”54  The Court held that the Illinois 
statute “presents no question under the Constitution of the United States.”55  
The Court reasoned that “[w]hether the legislative, executive, and judicial 
powers of a State shall be kept altogether distinct and separate . . . is for the 
determination of the State.”56  Ughbanks v. Armstrong,57 quickly followed 
Dreyer, and the Court upheld the new Michigan constitutional amendment 
 
 47. See People v. Cummings, 50 N.W. 310, 314 (Mich. 1891); see also Brownbridge v. People, 
38 Mich. 751, 754, 755 (1878). 
 48. See Cummings, 50 N.W. at 314; see also Brownbridge, 38 Mich. at 754. 
 49. See Cummings, 50 N.W. at 313; see also Brownbridge, 38 Mich. at 754 (“The common law 
has always condemned vague and indefinite sentences and has not inclined to the introduction of any 
involving conditional punishments.”). 
 50. Cummings, 88 N.W. at 313. 
 51. In re Campbell, 101 N.W. 826-28 (Mich. 1904). 
 52. See In re Conditional Discharge of Convicts, 51 A. 10, 15 (Vt. 1901) (determining a board of 
parole violates power of executive); see also State ex rel. Bishop v. State Bd. of Corrections, 52 P. 1090, 
1091, 1092 (Utah 1898) (also, determining a board of parole violates power of executive). 
 53. Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 83-84 (1902). 
 54. Id. at 71, 83. 
 55. Id. at 83-84. 
 56. Id. at 84. 
 57. 208. U.S. 481 (1908). 
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authorizing indeterminate sentences, holding that states have the power to 
exempt a person twice convicted of a felony from parole eligibility.58 
B. End of Federal Parole and Return to Determinate Sentencing 
As the twentieth century progressed, issues with indeterminate 
sentencing emerged.  The system received criticism for allegations of 
racism.59  Data showed that “black offenders receive[d] somewhat longer 
sentences for the same offenses than [did] white offenders.”60  Scholars also 
noted there was substantial gender disparity in indeterminate sentencing in 
favor of women.”61  The most prominent criticism came from the system’s 
“failure to remedy the situation for which it was designed: recidivism.”62  
According to the 1967 report of the President’s Crime Commission, nearly 
everyone who goes to prison is eventually released and between one-half 
and two-thirds of all those released are eventually later arrested and 
convicted again.63  These repeat offenders are called recidivists.64  In one 
study on recidivism, “[n]early one-third of the subjects failed in the first 
year to remain free of arrest or of parole or mandatory release violations.”65  
To address the problems of high recidivism rates and disparity in 
sentencing, the federal government passed the Sentencing Reform Act 
(SRA) of 1984, creating the Federal Sentencing Guides and abolishing 
parole for federal prisoners sentenced after November 1, 1987.66   Twenty-
eight states followed by implementing sentencing guidelines and Truth-in-
Sentencing statutes between 1996 and 1998.67  Its success in reducing 
recidivism is disputed.68 
 
 58. Id. at 487. 
 59. Richard Singer, In Favor of “Presumptive Sentences” Set by a Sentencing Commission, 5 
CRIM. JUST. Q. 88, 88 (1977). 
 60. See id.; see also Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2544 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Indeed, rather than 
reflect legally relevant criteria, these disparities too often were correlated with constitutionally suspect 
variables such as race.”). 
 61. Tonry, supra  note 46. 
 62. Gary L. Mason, Indeterminate Sentencing: Cruel and Unusual Punishment, or Just Plain 
Cruel?, 16 CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 89, 95 (1990). 
 63. Id. at 111-12 n.146. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Samuel L. Myers, Jr., Racial Disparities in Sentencing: Can Sentencing Reforms Reduce 
Discrimination in Punishment?, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 781, 797 (1993). 
 66. Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Federal Probation, 55 J. CORRECTIONAL PHIL. & PRAC., 
Dec. 1991, at 1; see Mark H. Luttrell, The Impact of the Sentencing Reform Act on Prison Management, 
55 J. CORRECTIONAL PHIL. & PRAC., Dec. 1991, at 54. 
 67. Susan Turner et al., The Impact of Truth-in-Sentencing and Three Strikes Legislation: Prison 
Populations, State Budgets, and Crime Rates, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 75, 76 (1999). 
 68. See William D. Bales et al., An Assessment of the Development and Outcomes of Determinate 
Sentencing in Florida, JUST. RES & POL.: FLA., May 2010, at 41, 61 (finding that truth-in-sentencing has 
contributed to Florida’s recidivism reduction); but see Christopher Slobogin, Prevention as the Primary 
Goal of Sentencing: The Modern Case for Indeterminate Dispositions in Criminal Cases, 48 SAN DIEGO 
9
Puzauskas and Morrow: NO INDETERMINATE SENTENCING WITHOUT PAROLE
Published by DigitalCommons@ONU, 2019
272 OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44 
The inherent impossibility of an indeterminate sentencing system 
without parole was recently recognized in the fallout over the Federal 
Sentencing Guides in the mid-2000s.69  A pair of Supreme Court decisions 
limited the applicability of the SRA, causing speculation that the United 
States might return to an indeterminate sentencing system.70  In Blakeley v. 
Washington, the Court required that any fact increasing a sentence beyond 
the maximum sentence a judge may impose without making any additional 
findings of fact “must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, unless 
the defendant waives his Sixth Amendment rights in this regard.”71  
Blakeley was quickly followed by United States v. Booker, in which the 
Court struck down two provisions of the SRA: the section making the 
Sentencing Guidelines mandatory and the establishment of appellate review 
standards for the Guidelines’ sentences.72  Scholars noted an evolution in 
the definition of indeterminate sentences from a broad range set by a judge 
with a parole board determining the ultimate release date, to a post-Blakeley 
definition which allows judges to set a definite sentence anywhere below 
the statutory maxima.73  Arizona’s statute does neither.74  It creates a broad 
indeterminate range set by the judge, without a parole board, to determine 
the ultimate release date.75  This sentencing structure as it stands rejects the 
entire premise that parole boards and indeterminate sentences were built 
upon and is completely contrary to both the academic and the legal 
understanding of how indeterminate sentences work. 
 
L. REV. 1, 45, 46 (2011) (arguing that indeterminate sentencing is the most cost-effective means of 
reducing recidivism). 
 69. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2549-50; see United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 235, 245-46, 264-
65 (2005). 
 70. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2549-50; see Booker, 543 U.S. at 235, 245-46, 264-65. 
 71. United States v. Einstman, 325 F. Supp. 2d 373, 374–75 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing Blakely, 124 
S. Ct. at 2536); see Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Parole: Corpse or Phoenix?, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 303, 322 
(2013). 
 72. Booker, 543 U.S. at 227, 259. 
 73. Steven L. Chanenson, The Next Era of Sentencing Reform, 54 EMORY L. J. 377, 382 n.18 
(2005) (identifying a number of cases where judges use an incorrect definition of ‘indeterminate 
sentencing’).  These cases include: United States v. Hakley, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15784, at *21 (W.D. 
Mich. Aug. 12, 2004) (displaying an incorrect understanding of “indeterminate” sentencing); United 
States v. Agett, 327 F. Supp. 2d 899, 906 (E.D. Tenn. 2004) (same); United States v. Sisson, 326 F. 
Supp. 2d 203, 205 (D. Mass. 2004) (finding the Federal Sentencing Guidelines unconstitutional in light 
of Blakely and erroneously describing the Court’s “return to an indeterminate sentencing scheme” when 
the context indicates that the court will employ a discretionary, determinate sentencing system and 
apparently treat the Guidelines as fully voluntary); United States v. Lockett, 325 F. Supp. 2d 673, 677-78 
(E.D. Va. 2004)); see also Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 2463, 2468 n.12 (2004) (referring to both modern and traditional definitions of indeterminate and 
determinate sentencing). 
 74. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1604.09 (LexisNexis 2017). 
 75. See Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 116 (1991) (noting that the state, “recommended an 
indeterminate life sentence with a minimum of ‘somewhere between ten and [twenty] years.’”); In re D., 
617 P.2d 1087, 1089, 1092, 1093 (Cal. 1980) (“[C]onstitutes an indeterminate [twenty-five] years to life 
sentence.”). 
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In the fallout from the Supreme Court’s Blakely decision, several 
federal courts held the entire SRA unconstitutional and some referred to a 
reversion to indeterminate sentencing.76  In United States v. King, the 
Middle District of Florida held that “the unavoidable result of finding the 
[Federal Sentencing] Guidelines unconstitutional in their entirety is a return 
to an indeterminate system.”77  However, the court defined the 
indeterminate system as selecting a determinate sentence from an 
indeterminate range.78  The court in King relied on United States v. 
Einstman, which defined an indeterminate sentencing system as one where 
“judges are free to consider all relevant factors and to sentence the 
defendant anywhere between the statutory minimum (if there be one) and 
the statutory maximum[.]”79  Neither the court in King nor the court in 
Einstman proposed anything like the system currently employed in 
Arizona.80 
The District of Massachusetts, in United States v. Mueffelman,81 
rejected the idea that an indeterminate sentencing system could exist 
without parole, stating “plainly there is a problem with reinstituting an 
indeterminate system, when there is no longer parole.”82  The District of 
Utah reached the same conclusion as Mueffelman in United States v. 
Wilson.83  While recognizing the sentencing guidelines as unconstitutional, 
the court held it will continue to give the guidelines considerable weight and 
that without parole “rehabilitation is a subordinate consideration to just 
punishment and crime control.”84  The courts in Mueffelman and Wilson 
thus considered and rejected the system currently in place in Arizona.85  
Heritage Foundation fellow Paul Larkin, commenting on the end of the 
SRA and a possible resurrection of federal parole, wrote in 2013, “[a]n 
advisory Sentencing Guidelines system without parole would have resulted 
in a far worse punishment mechanism, one with no check on system-wide 
sentencing disparities[.]”86  Every scholar since the start of sentencing 
 
 76. See Einstman, 325 F. Supp at 381; see also United States v. King, 328 F. Supp. 2d 1276, 
1284 (M.D. Fla. 2004). 
 77. King, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 1284. 
 78. See id. at 1287 (utilizing a sentencing range of five to forty years, the first defendant received 
forty-eight months, the second defendant received sixty months). 
 79. Einstman, 325 F. Supp. 2d at 381. 
 80. See id.; see also King, 328 F. Supp. at 1284. 
 81. 327 F. Supp. 2d 79 (D. Mass. 2004). 
 82. Id. at 96. 
 83. 350 F. Supp. 2d 910, 922 (D. Utah 2005). 
 84. Id. at 921. 
 85. See Mueffleman, 327 F. Supp. at 96; Wilson, 350 F. Supp. at 922; see also ARIZ. STATE 
SENATE, TRUTH IN SENTENCING 1-2 (2010), 
http://www.azleg.gov/briefs/Senate/TRUTH%20IN%20SENTENCING.pdf. 
 86. Larkin, supra note71, at 333. 
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reform in the nineteenth century recognizes what the court in Mueffelman 
concluded, that parole is required for an indeterminate sentencing system.87 
C. Arizona after Truth-in-Sentencing: Indeterminate Sentencing without 
Parole 
The Arizona legislature passed the state’s Truth-in Sentencing statute in 
1993.88  The law eliminated parole and reintroduced determinative 
sentences with the opportunity for earned release credits.89  Most Arizona 
criminal defendants can expect to be released for good behavior after 
serving 85% of their sentence.90  However, the new Truth-in Sentencing law 
did not amend Arizona’s indeterminate sentencing statutes; it only 
eliminated parole for all offenses committed on or after January 1, 1994.91  
Four statutes in Arizona still impose indeterminate sentences of “life with 
the possibility of [release] after twenty-five [or thirty-five] years.”92  Under 
the current sentencing scheme, release possibilities are limited to executive 
clemency or a future legislative change.  The first Arizona prisoners will 
reach their minimum time served in 2019, and will be able to challenge the 
limited possibilities of release.93 
“Release” is not clearly defined by statute, but includes “parole, work 
furlough, community supervision[.]” for the purpose of offenses committed 
while released from confinement.94  For Arizona’s indeterminate sentencing 
scheme the two commonly used types of release are parole and executive 
clemency, which the courts have repeatedly conflated.95  Some Arizona 
 
 87. Mueffleman, 327 F. Supp. at 96. 
 88. See 1993 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1404 (explaining that the purpose of S.B. 1049 was “to promote 
truth and accountability in sentencing”); see also ARIZ. STATE SENATE, supra note 85 (encouraging the 
Arizona law with a new program, the Violent Offender Incarceration and Truth-in-Sentencing (VOI/TIS) 
Incentive Grant Program).  “During a five-year period, [the Arizona Department of Corrections] received 
a total of $57,923,000 in VOI/TIS grants, which are nonappropriated, for the development of additional 
medium and maximum security prisoner bed space.” Id. at 2. 
 89. ARIZ. STATE SENATE, supra note 85. 
 90. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1604.07(LexisNexis 2017). 
 91. See 1993 Ariz. Sess. Laws 746 (amending Arizona’s capital-sentencing statute creating, 
among other changes, a sentence of natural life, which “[i]s not subject to commutation or parole, work 
furlough or work release.”) (emphasis added); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13–716 (LexisNexis 2017) 
(extending eligibility has since been extended to juvenile offenders serving “life” sentences); see also 
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016). 
 92. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-751 (LexisNexis 2016) (murder); § 13–705 (LexisNexis 2016) 
(sexual conduct with a minor) §13-706 (LexisNexis 2016) (serious offenders); § 13-1003 (LexisNexis 
2016) (conspiracy). 
 93. See, e.g., State v. Sperberg, No. 2 CA-CR 2010-0156-PR, 2010 WL 4286203, at *191, *195 
(Ariz. Ct. App. Oct. 27, 2010) (involving a 1994 murder plea). 
 94. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-708. 
 95. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1604.09 (LexisNexis 2017); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 31-403 
(LexisNexis 2017). 
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courts have upheld sentences of “life with a possibility of parole,”96 while 
others have upheld sentences of “life with a possibility of release.”97 
In the pre-Lynch III line of death penalty cases, when the courts refused 
to allow the defendants to inform the jury of their parole ineligibility, courts 
held that the defendants “would have been eligible for other forms of 
release, such as executive clemency[.]”98  However, the court is mistaken.  
Release is not the same as executive clemency.99  Arizona’s Truth-in 
Sentencing law only eliminated the mechanism for parole eligibility.100  
Prisoners sentenced to “life with the possibility of release” should still be 
entitled to a hearing before the parole board and not limited to an 
application for clemency. 
III.  POSSIBILITY OF RELEASE: PAROLE OR CLEMENCY? 
A threshold issue needs to be addressed before examining the validity 
of Arizona’s indeterminate “life” sentences: whether executive clemency 
offers a suitably equivalent opportunity for release as parole.  It does not. 
A.  From ‘Parole’ to ‘Release’ 
Arizona has provided a system of parole since statehood.101  A “life” 
sentence has provided the possibility of parole since at least 1973, when the 
legislature amended section 13-751 of the Arizona Revised Statute (then 
titled section 13-453) to make defendants who are sentenced to life 
imprisonment eligible for parole after twenty-five years.102  In 1985, the 
Arizona legislature passed House Bill 2218, Crimes Against Children, 
which removed the word “parole” from section 13-751 of the Arizona 
Revised Code (then titled section 13-703) and replaced it with the phrase 
“release on any basis,” language identical to that can be found in the parole 
eligibility statute section 41-1604.09 of the Arizona Revised Statute (then 
 
 96. See State v. Ovante, 291 P.3d 974, 977 (Ariz. 2013) (sentencing for a 2008 murder). 
 97. See State v. Brown, 310 P.3d 29, 32 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013) (sentencing for a 2010 murder). 
 98. See, e.g., State v. Cota, 272 P.3d 1027, 1042 (Ariz. 2012). 
 99. Release, THE FREE DICTIONARY, https://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/release (last 
visited Feb. 21, 2018); Executive Clemency, THE FREE DICTIONARY, https://legal-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/executive+clemency (last visited Feb. 21, 2018). 
 100. ARIZ. STATE SENATE, supra note 85, at 1. 
 101. See Laird v. Sims, 147 P. 738, 742 (Ariz. 1915) (“all prisoners who have served the minimum 
sentence, when it is an indeterminate sentence, as well as those serving definite or fixed sentences, may 
appear and apply for a parole or an absolute discharge.”); see also State ex rel. Murphy v. Super. Ct. of 
Maricopa Cty., 246 P. 1033, 1035 (Ariz. 1926) (“The Legislature having provided for a minimum and a 
maximum term of sentence, it certainly accords with reason to assume that it had a purpose in so doing . 
. . The reason and the language of the legislation can point to but one conclusion, and that is that a 
prisoner sentenced to an indeterminate sentence should at all events serve the minimum thereof.”). 
 102. 1977 Ariz. Sess. Laws 719. 
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titled section 41-1604.06).103  “Release on any basis” is also the phrase 
found in the conspiracy to commit murder statute, last amended in 1978.104  
As part of the 1985 law, the legislature amended the parole eligibility 
statute, section 41-1604.09 of the Arizona Revised Statute, to require 
defendants sentenced under section 13-751 to serve the full minimum term 
instead of two-thirds of the sentence.105  The 1985 Arizona Legislative 
Report includes no reference to parole,106 nor did courts change their 
criminal sentencing practices.107  In 1985, “release” still meant “parole,” but 
the new law worked to prohibit release on parole, or any other means, until 
the prisoner served the mandatory twenty-five years.108 
In 1993, the Arizona legislature passed House Bill 2048, adding the 
possible sentence of “natural life” for murder defendants in addition to the 
death penalty and the indeterminate “life” sentence.109  The legislature 
indicated that a defendant sentenced to “natural life” is, among other things, 
not eligible for parole.110  This change in the law kept “without possibility 
of release” for indeterminate sentences, which is the phrase used to refer to 
parole eligibility since 1985 for murder, and since 1978 for conspiracy to 
commit murder.111  Two days after passing House Bill 2048, the legislature 
passed Senate Bill 1049, Truth-in-Sentencing, which limited eligibility for 
parole under Title 41 to defendants who committed their crime after January 
1, 1994, but did not alter the four sentences under which defendants receive 
parole eligibility and have historically received parole eligibility.112 
During the period between the establishment of Truth-in-Sentencing in 
Arizona in 1994 and the Court’s Lynch III decision in 2016, Arizona courts 
 
 103. 1985 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1438. 
 104. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1003(D) (“Conspiracy to commit a class 1 felony is punishable by a 
sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of release on any basis until the service of twenty-five 
years. . . .”). 
 105. 1985 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1454. 
 106. See ARIZ. LEGISLATIVE REPORT 1985 145. 
 107. Compare State v. Nardi, 2015 WL 503219, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2015) (convicting 
defendant of 1991 murder sentenced by trial court to life imprisonment with a possibility of parole after 
twenty-five years) with State v. Villa, 2010 WL 2892889, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. July 23, 2010) 
(convicting defendant of 1995 murder and sentenced by trial court to life imprisonment with a possibility 
of parole after twenty-five years). 
 108. 1985 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1454. 
 109. 1993 Ariz. Sess. Laws 746; see also State v. Ring, 65 P.3d 915, 933 (Ariz. 2003) (noting that 
“[i]n 1993, the Arizona Legislature amended A.R.S. section 13–703 to add a ‘natural life’ sentencing 
option for defendants convicted of first degree murder.”). 
 110. State v. Barreras, 892 P.2d 852, 860 n.7 (Ariz. 1995) (“A.R.S. § 13-703(A) now permits a 
sentence of life without possibility of parole.” (citing 1993 Ariz. Sess. Laws 746)). 
 111. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703 (1985); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1003(D). 
 112. 1993 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1486. 
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treated “parole,” “release” and “clemency” interchangeably.113  Part of the 
overall confusion likely stems from the transfer of power from the former 
Board of Pardons and Paroles to the Board of Executive Clemency.114  
Additional confusion comes from Arizona statutes that aggravate sentences 
for crimes committed while on any form of release.115  However, as a matter 
of law and practice, parole and clemency are different concepts.116  A 
defendant is far less likely to obtain clemency than parole. 
B. Differences in Clemency and Parole Procedures 
Parole and clemency are distinct legal terms.117  Parole is defined as 
“[t]he conditional release of a prisoner from imprisonment before the full 
sentence has been served.”118  Clemency is “the power of the President or a 
governor to pardon a criminal or commute a criminal sentence.”119  The two 
typical forms of clemency are commutation, which is the reduction in the 
severity of punishment, and pardon, or the nullification of the 
punishment.120  Arizona uses significantly different procedures to evaluate 
clemency and parole applicants.121  Additionally, parole and clemency 
fulfill separate purposes. 
Clemency applications must meet a higher legal burden than parole 
applications.  Prisoners seeking clemency may apply to the Board of 
Executive Clemency which then 
may make recommendations to the governor for commutation of 
sentence after finding by clear and convincing evidence that the 
 
 113. See, e.g., State v. Boyston, 298 P.3d 887, 901 (Ariz. 2013) (defendant “would have been 
eligible for other forms of release, such as executive clemency, if sentenced to life with the possibility of 
release.”). 
 114. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 31-402(C)(1) (LexisNexis 2016) (“The board of executive clemency . . . 
is vested with the powers and duties of the board of pardons and paroles as they existed before January 
1, 1994.”); see State v. Godinez, No. 2 CA–CR 2013–0114–PR, 2013 WL 3788427, at *2 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. July 17, 2013) (finding “of no import the fact that it is no longer the ‘parole board’ but rather the 
Board of Executive Clemency to whom a petition for release must be sought in the first instance.”). 
 115. See State v. Melcher, No. 2 CA-CR 2012-0158, 2013 WL 2378573 at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. May 
29, 2013).  The court relied improperly on Bruggeman to hold that the word parole is not legally 
significant and is instead synonymous with “release from confinement,” when Bruggeman found “no 
error because there is no distinction between parole and probation under [the crimes committed while on 
any form of release statute].” See id.; see also State v. Bruggeman, 779 P.2d 823, 826 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1989). 
 116. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 300 (1983). 
 117. Compare Parole, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014), with Clemency, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY. 
 118. Parole, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY. 
 119. Clemency, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY. 
 120. Commutation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY; Pardon, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY.  This paper 
focuses exclusively on the commutation form of clemency. 
 121. Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 31-402 (C)(2), with ARIZ. REV. STAT. 31-412(A) (LexisNexis 
2016). 
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sentence imposed is clearly excessive given the nature of the 
offense and the record of the offender and that there is a substantial 
probability that when released the offender will conform the 
offender’s conduct to the requirements of the law.122 
If a commutation of sentence is denied by the Board or if the governor 
denies a commutation recommendation by the Board, the person must wait 
at least three years before re-applying for commutation, whereas parole 
consideration is generally every six months to a year.123  Persons who apply 
for clemency face several restrictions for consideration by the Board, and 
the governor may not grant a commutation of sentence without a 
recommendation from the Board.124 
An Arizona commutation hearing occurs in two phases.  Phase I is held 
in-absentia (the inmate is not in attendance); however, the hearing is open to 
the public who may present statements in support or opposition to the 
prisoner’s application.125  If the prisoner has legal representation, his or her 
counsel may also appear at a Phase I hearing.126  The Phase I hearing is 
limited to a consideration of whether the sentence is excessive in light of the 
prisoner’s crime and record (the former part of the statute).127  If the Board 
agrees by majority vote that the sentence is excessive, the prisoner is passed 
to Phase II.128  At a Phase II hearing, the prisoner appears by video.129  The 
public and the prisoner’s counsel may also appear.130  The primary question 
at a Phase II hearing is whether the prisoner will remain law-abiding upon 
release from prison, generally focusing on the prisoner’s prison record and 
plans upon release.131  If, after hearing all of the information, the Board 
determines that a reduction in time served is appropriate, the Board will 
transmit the recommendation to the governor for a final determination.132 
In contrast, the decision to grant parole is governed by a requirement to 
consider the prisoner’s entire record, “‘including the gravity of the offense 
in the particular case.’”133  The inmate is entitled to “an opportunity to be 
 
 122. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 31–402(C)(2). 
 123. Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 31-402(C)(2), with ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1604.09(G). 
 124. ARIZ. CONST. art. V, § 5; ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 31–403 (LexisNexis 2016). 
 125. ARIZ. BD. OF EXEC. CLEMENCY, ANNUAL REPORT 13 (2015). 
 126. Frequently Asked Questions, ARIZ. BOARD OF EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY (last visited Feb. 21, 
2018), https://boec.az.gov/helpful-information/frequently-asked-questions. 
 127. ARIZ. BD. OF EX. CLEMENCY, supra note 125. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 31-402(C)(2). 
 132. ARIZ. BD. OF EXEC. CLEMENCY, supra note 125. 
 133. Cooper v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 717 P.2d 861, 864 (Ariz. 1986) (citing 
Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 15). 
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heard” on the parole application.134  The Board must “either approve, with 
or without conditions, or reject the prisoner’s application for parole[.]”135  In 
determining whether to grant parole, the Board must consider whether 
“there is a substantial probability that the applicant will remain at liberty 
without violating the law and that the release is in the best interests of the 
state.”136  When parole is denied, the Board provides the Director with “a 
written statement specifying the individualized reasons for the denial of 
parole,” and the inmate has the opportunity to review the Board’s 
statement.137  If the inmate remains eligible for parole, recertification occurs 
between one and four months after the hearing at which parole was 
denied.138 
Finally, parole and clemency fulfill separate purposes in the criminal 
justice system.139  The purpose of clemency is to reduce a sentence if it is 
excessive, while the purpose of parole is to release prisoners if they will be 
law abiding.140  Clemency for those with the possibility of release after 
twenty-five years instead of parole is meaningless because the possibility of 
parole in twenty-five years is already the most lenient alternative to a 
natural life term or death.141 
C. Parole is Distinct from Clemency as a Matter of Constitutional Law 
The most significant difference between parole and clemency involves a 
prisoner’s constitutional right to due process during the proceedings.142  The 
Supreme Court of the United States has held, as a matter of law, that “parole 
and commutation are different concepts, despite some surface 
similarities.”143 
A state statute can create a right to be heard by a parole board.144  In 
Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Corr. Complex, the 
Supreme Court of the United States determined that states can create a 
 
 134. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 31–411(B) (LexisNexis 2016). 
 135. Id. (C). 
 136. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 31–412(A) (LexisNexis 2016). 
 137. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 31–411(G). 
 138. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41–1604.09(G).  However, the Board may prescribe that the inmate shall 
not be recertified for a period of up to one year after the hearing. See id.; see also Ariz. Att’y Gen. Op. 
No. I14-007 at *4 (Oct. 3, 2014). 
 139. Compare Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 411–12 (1993) (reasoning “[c]lemency is deeply 
rooted in our Anglo–American tradition of law, and is the historic remedy for preventing miscarriages of 
justice where judicial process has been exhausted.”), with Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 8 (stating that the 
“parole system serves the public-interest purposes of rehabilitation and deterrence . . . .”). 
 140. Compare Herrera, 506 U.S. at 411-12, with Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 8. 
 141. See State v. Fell, 97 P.3d 902, 912 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004), aff’d, 115 P.3d 594 (Ariz. 2005) 
(referring to defendants sentenced under A.R.S. § 13-703 (1999), now A.R.S. § 13-751 (2016)). 
 142. See generally Solem, 463 U.S. 277 (comparing parole and clemency). 
 143. Id. at 300. 
 144. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 16. 
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liberty interest in parole, therefore granting prisoners the right to due 
process.145  Under Greenholtz, a statute that “affords an opportunity to be 
heard” satisfies due process.146  Additionally, parole revocation is always 
entitled to due process.147  However, unlike parole, the power of the 
executive to pardon, or grant clemency, being a matter of grace, is rarely 
subject to judicial review.148 
There is no general right to clemency.149  In Connecticut Bd. of Pardons 
v. Dumschat, the Supreme Court of the United States contrasted a prisoner’s 
clemency application with the parole statute in Greenholtz.150  The Court 
found that, while a commutation decision shares some of the characteristics 
of a decision whether to grant parole,151 “there is a vast difference between a 
denial of parole . . . and a state’s refusal to commute a lawful sentence.”152  
The Court reasoned that the mere existence of a power to commute a 
lawfully imposed sentence, and the granting of commutations to many 
petitioners, “create no right or ‘entitlement.’”153 
Arizona employs two different standards for parole and clemency.154  
The standard to be released is much higher for commutation than for parole; 
commutation requires that the Board must find by clear and convincing 
evidence that the sentence itself is excessive given the nature of the original 
offense and the record of the prisoner.155  The Arizona courts have adopted 
the definition of “‘clear and convincing’ that requires the jury to “‘be 
persuaded that the truth of the contention is ‘highly probable.’”156  This 
standard requires the Board to consider the relationship of the sentence to 
the nature of the offense and the record of the prisoner.157  Unless the Board 
determines by high evidentiary standard that the sentence is excessive given 
the nature of the offense it cannot recommend commutation and, “while the 
 
 145. Id. at 24-25. 
 146. Id. at 16. 
 147. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (noting that a parolee’s liberty involves 
significant values within the protection of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 148. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 280 (1998). 
 149. Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 467 (1981). 
 150. Id. at 466. 
 151. Id. at 464. 
 152. Id. at 466. 
 153. Id. at 467. 
 154. Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 31-412(A) (the standard for release on parole is if “it appears to 
the Board, in its sole discretion, that there is a substantial probability that the applicant will remain at 
liberty without violating the law and that the release is in the best interests of the state), with ARIZ. REV. 
STAT § 31-402(C)(2) (requiring a finding of clear and convincing evidence that the imposed sentence is 
“clearly excessive given the nature of the offense” . . . .). 
 155. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 31–402. 
 156. State v. Roque, 141 P.3d 368, 390 (Ariz. 2006), abbrogated by State v. Escalante-Orozco, 
386 P.3d 798 (Ariz. 2017), (quoting In re Neville, 708 P.2d 1297, 1302 (Ariz. 1985)) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 157. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 31-402(C)(2). 
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Courts can compel the Board to act, the Court cannot compel the Board to 
act in any particular manner.”158 
In Arizona, the decision to release a prisoner on parole focuses 
primarily on what a man is and what he may become rather than simply 
what he has done.159  The Board considers “‘the entire record . . . to the time 
of the sentence, including the gravity of the offense in the particular 
case.’”160  Arizona’s parole statute states that the board “shall authorize the 
release” of eligible applicants and if “it appears to the board, in its sole 
discretion, that there is a substantial probability that the applicant will 
remain at liberty without violating the law and that the release is in the best 
interests of the state.” 161  The power of parole rests with the Board and not 
in the governor.162  Arizona’s parole statute “uses mandatory language 
(‘shall’) to ‘creat[e] a presumption that parole release will be granted’ when 
the designated findings are made.”163  Arizona’s parole statute, like 
Nebraska’s in Greenholtz, grants a recognized liberty interest in parole.164 
D. Clemency is not a Meaningful Opportunity for Release 
In addition to the higher standards, more difficult procedures, separate 
public policy principles, and constitutional distinctions, data from the 
Arizona Board of Executive Clemency demonstrates just how rare 
commutation is as compared to parole.165  The Supreme Court of the United 
States has previously examined the statistical likelihood of clemency and 
 
 158. State ex rel. Ariz. State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles v. Super. Ct. of Maricopa Cty., 467 P.2d 
917, 920 (1970). 
 159. Cooper v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 717 P.2d 861, 864 (Ariz. 1986) (citing 
Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 8 (1974)). 
 160. Id. (quoting Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 15) (emphasis in original). 
 161. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 31–412(A). 
 162. See State ex rel. Ariz. State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 467 P.2d at 920; see also State v. 
Wagstaff, 794 P.2d 118, 121 (Ariz. 1990) (“The exclusive power to grant parole rests with the Board of 
Pardons and Paroles.” (quoting State v. Wagstaff, 775 P.2d 1130 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988))). 
 163. Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 377–78 (1987) (quoting Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12) 
(alteration in original) (comparing a Montana statute to a Nebraska statute, both of which used the word 
“shall” to indicate that the provision was mandatory)).  Likewise, the Arizona parole statute is 
mandatory: “If a prisoner is certified as eligible for parole pursuant to § 41-1604.09 the board of 
executive clemency shall authorize the release of the applicant on parole . . .” if the statute’s 
requirements are met. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 31-412 (emphasis added). 
 164. See Stewart v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 753 P.2d 1194, 1199 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) 
(“Because we conclude that A.R.S. § 31-412 creates a protected liberty interest in parole release, we 
must determine what due process rights should have been accorded [the petitioner] and whether the 
Board observed them.”); Ariz. Att’y Gen. Op. No. I14-007, 2014 WL 5017942, at *4 (Oct. 3, 2014). 
 165. Terry Reid, Miller v. Alabama: Is Arizona’s Sentencing Scheme Unconstitutional as Applied 
to Juvenile Offenders Convicted of First Degree Murder?, 24 FOR THE DEFENSE, Feb. 2014, at 1, 5-6, 
https://www.maricopa.gov/DocumentCenter/View/2443/For-the-Defense—-February-to-April-2014-
PDF. 
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parole to determine if they provide a meaningful opportunity for release.166  
Clemency in Arizona is not a meaningful opportunity for release.167 
A meaningful opportunity for release is required under the due process 
clause.168  The Court held in Solem v. Helm, that a statutory scheme which 
only provides for release by commutation does not provide a meaningful 
opportunity for release.169  The Court recognized parole as a regular part of 
the rehabilitative process and that, assuming good behavior, it is the normal 
expectation in the vast majority of cases.170  In contrast to commutation, 
which is an ad hoc exercise of executive clemency that may occur at any 
time for any reason without reference to any standards, the law generally 
specifies when a prisoner will be parole eligible, and details the standards 
and procedures applicable at that time.171  Thus, it is possible to predict, at 
least to some extent, when parole might be granted.172 
The Court in Solem compared clemency in South Dakota for prisoners 
with life sentences, with the application of parole in Texas examined in 
Rummel v. Estelle,173 to determine if the sentence violated the Eighth 
Amendment.174  “In South Dakota, no life sentence has been commuted in 
over eight years, while parole—where authorized—has been granted 
regularly during that period.”175  Texas had “a relatively liberal policy of 
granting ‘good time’ credits to its prisoners, a policy that historically has 
allowed a prisoner serving a life sentence to become eligible for parole in as 
little as 12 years.”176  The Court analyzed the statistical difficulty in 
obtaining commutation compared with parole and based on those 
differences the Court concluded that “[t]he possibility of commutation of a 
life sentence under South Dakota law [was] not sufficient to save 
respondent’s otherwise unconstitutional sentence on the asserted theory that 
this possibility matches the possibility of parole.”177  The Court reasoned 
 
 166. Id. 
 167. See State v. Vera, 334 P.3d 754 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014). 
 168. See Reid, supra note 165, at 2 (noting that “[i]n 2010, the Supreme Court held that a juvenile 
convicted of a non-homicide offense could not be sentenced to life without parole, but must be given 
some ‘meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation’” 
(quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010))). 
 169. See Solem, 463 U.S. at, 282, 300, 301 (holding that life imprisonment without possibility of 
parole imposed upon defendant convicted of uttering no account check for $100 prohibited by Eighth 
Amendment). 
 170. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 477 (“[t]he practice of releasing prisoners on parole before the end of 
their sentences has become an integral part of the penological system.”). 
 171. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 31-412. 
 172. Solem, 463 U.S. at 300. 
 173. 445 U.S. 263 (1980). 
 174. Solem, 463 U.S. at 297-98. 
 175. Id. at 279. 
 176. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 280. 
 177. Solem, 463 U.S. at 278. 
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“that the South Dakota commutation system is fundamentally different from 
the parole system that was before us in Rummel.”178 
Statistics provided by the Arizona Board of Clemency show that 
between 2004 and 2016 the Board heard an average of 594.9 clemency 
hearings per year, recommended an average of 48.2 prisoners a year to the 
governor who granted clemency to an average of 6.7, or 1.5% of all 
applicants.179  During that same period, the Board granted an average of 88 
out of 436 parole applications a year, or 21.3%.180  The data in Figure 1 and 
Figure 2 clearly shows that parole offers a significantly higher opportunity 
for release than clemency.181 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Clemency in Arizona 2004-2016 
FY 
Phase I 
Hearing
Phase II 
Hearings
Recommendations 
Governor Granted % 
2004 960 87 87 11 1.10% 
2005 972 110 101 13 1.30% 
2006 604 84 52 9 1.50% 
2007 704 102 70 4 0.60% 
2008 586 94 63 7 1.20% 
2009 656 97 61 9 1.40% 
2010 406 53 41 6 1.50% 
2011 303 54 47 8 2.60% 
2012 398 70 50 9 2.30% 
2013 115 60 24 6 0.50% 
2014 305 55 26 2 0.66% 
2015 200 15 2 1 0.50% 
2016 483 19 2 n/a <0.41
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 178. Id. at 300. 
 179. Reid, supra note 165. 
 180. See Policies and Reports: Annual Reports Fiscal Years 2014-2017 ARIZ. BOARD EXECUTIVE 
CLEMENCY (last visited Feb. 21, 2018), https://boec.az.gov/agendas-reports-and-policies/policies-and-
reports; see also Reid, supra note 165, at 6 (2013 statistics are through July only). 
 181. Reid, supra note 165, at 5-6. 
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Figure 2: Parole in Arizona 2004-2016 
FY Hearings Granted % 
2004 694 242 34.9% 
2005 574 47 25.6% 
2006 485 126 26% 
2007 427 72 16.9% 
2008 458 83 18.1% 
2009 472 88 18.6% 
2010 439 68 15.5% 
2011 313 82 26.2% 
2012 329 72 21.9% 
2013 326 80 24.5% 
2014 370 95 25.7% 
2015 390 46 11.8% 
2016 397 47 11.8% 
 
Clemency in Arizona does not offer the same consideration for release 
that parole does.  Prisoners described by the Arizona courts as “eligible for 
other forms of release, such as executive clemency,”182 are denied a 
fundamental requirement of due process.183  Unlike the Arizona courts, the 
Supreme Court of the United States’ Solem decision determined the 
defendants “argument that he is not likely to actually be released” is 
relevant.184  Arizona data comparing the likelihood of obtaining a 
commutation of sentence versus parole shows that a prisoner is fifteen times 
more likely on average to be released on parole than clemency and in some 
years parole applicants are thirty-one times more likely to be released.185  
Clemency is neither legally nor factually comparable to parole as an 
opportunity to be heard or released. 
 
 182. Cota, 272 P.3d at 1042.  However, there remains speculation as to what the Arizona 
Department of Corrections will actually do when faced with this issue. See Letter from Amy Bjelland, 
Gen. Counsel for the Ariz. Dep’t of Corr., to Judge Hotham, RE: Joyce, Justin Jacob (Jan. 14, 2004). 
[hereinafter Letter]. 
 183. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965) (citing Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 
(1914)) (“A fundamental requirement of due process is ‘the opportunity to be heard.’  It is an 
opportunity which must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”) (internal 
citations omitted)). 
 184. Solem, 463 U.S. at 302-03; see, e.g., State v. Hargrave, 234 P.3d 569, 583 (Ariz. 2010) 
(“Hargrave’s argument that he is not likely to actually be released does not render the instruction legally 
incorrect.” (citing State v. Dann, 207 P.3d 604 (Ariz. 2009)); id. (citing State v. Cruz, 181 P.3d 196 
(Ariz. 2008) (finding that trial court did not err in precluding Board chairman from testifying as to how 
life sentences are handled in Arizona, finding that such testimony was too speculative to be relevant)). 
 185. Reid, supra note 165 (2004 statistics). 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
Arizona’s lack of parole consideration after Truth-in-Sentencing creates 
three legal deficiencies depending on the sentenced imposed: (1) capital 
defendants denied their due process right under Simmons and Lynch III to 
inform the jury they would be ineligible for parole are entitled to a new jury 
sentencing; (2) prisoners sentenced by the court to life with the possibility 
of “parole” after twenty-five years that are denied a parole hearing are 
denied a due process right to be heard; and (3) defendants who pled guilty 
with a stipulated sentence of life with the possibility of “parole” after 
twenty-five years are likely able to either withdraw from their plea 
agreements when those deals are breached by the state’s inability to uphold 
the promised parole hearings or request the judiciary to order specific 
performance on their pleas.186 
A. Death Row Simmons Cases after Lynch III 
The Supreme Court of the United States addressed the first problem 
when it overturned the death sentence of Shawn Patrick Lynch in 2016.187  
Two different juries convicted Lynch of first degree murder for the 2001 
murder of James Panzarella.188  Lynch faced the possibility of death, natural 
life, or “life with the possibility of release after 25 years.”189  The first jury 
failed to come to a unanimous verdict,190 but the second and third juries 
sentenced Lynch to death.191  During the trial, prosecutors suggested that 
Lynch could be dangerous in the future.192  The Supreme Court previously 
held in Simmons v. South Carolina, that “where the defendant’s future 
dangerousness is at issue, and state law prohibits the defendant’s release on 
parole, due process requires that the sentencing jury be informed that the 
defendant is parole ineligible.”193  Although Arizona law does not currently 
offer Lynch the possibility of parole, the Arizona Supreme Court denied the 
Simmons instruction and proceeded on the theory that Arizona’s statute 
 
 186. See, e.g., State v. Olague, 381 P.3d 269, 271 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016).  Additionally, prisoners 
sentenced to life without the possibility of release for twenty-five years are only able to apply for 
clemency as long as Truth-in-Sentencing remains. ARIZ. STATE SENATE, supra note 85, at 1-2; see 
generally Matthew B. Meehan, A Gathering Storm: Future Challenges Necessitate Reform of Arizona’s 
Dysfunctional Post-Conviction Regime, 9 ARIZ. SUMMIT L. REV. 1 (2016) (arguing that Truth-in-
Sentencing and clemency create a de-facto natural life sentence which implicate the Eighth 
Amendment). 
 187. Lynch III, 136 S. Ct. at 1818 (2016). 
 188. State v. Lynch (Lynch II), 357 P.3d 119, 127. 
 189. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13–751(A) (emphasis added). 
 190. State v. Lynch (Lynch I), 234 P.3d 595, 601 (Ariz. 2010). 
 191. Lynch II, 357 P.3d at 127, rev’d, 136 S. Ct. 1818 (2016). 
 192. Id. at 138. 
 193. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 156 (1994). 
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authorized the imposition of release-eligible sentences, thus creating a 
possibility of parole, even though parole is not currently available.194  Lynch 
attempted to waive his right to be considered for a release-eligible sentence 
and requested that the jury be instructed regarding his ineligibility for 
release, but the Arizona Supreme Court stated that “[p]arole eligibility is not 
a right that can be waived” and executive clemency created a possibility of 
release.195  In its brief opposing Lynch’s petition for writ of certiorari, the 
State suggested that “‘nothing prevents the legislature from creating a 
parole system in the future for which [Lynch] would have been eligible had 
the court sentenced him to life with the possibility of release after 25 
years.’”196 
However, in Simmons the Court stated “that the potential for future 
‘legislative reform’ could not justify refusing a parole-ineligibility 
instruction.”197  Although the trial court’s jury instruction was an accurate 
statement of Arizona law,198 “Simmons expressly rejected the argument that 
the possibility of clemency diminishes a capital defendant’s right to inform 
a jury of his parole ineligibility.”199  The Court granted the petition and 
overturned the decision of the Arizona Supreme Court.200 
The Court’s Lynch III decision creates an immediate problem for 
Arizona’s courts by providing an opening for death row inmates to 
challenge their sentences.201  Before Lynch III, the Arizona Supreme Court 
rejected a Simmons jury instruction for at least nine eligible defendants,202 
while at least four more preserved the issue for appeal.203  Other defendants 
who failed to preserve the issue may be able to argue that they received 
ineffective assistance of counsel.204  Unlike juvenile offenders sentenced to 
natural life before Miller, the Lynch III decision opens a path for several 
 
 194. Lynch II, 357 P.3d at 138. 
 195. Id. at 103-04. 
 196. Lynch III, 136 S. Ct. at 1820. 
 197. Id. (citing Simmons, 512 U.S. at 166). 
 198. Id. at 1822 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 199. Id. at 1819. 
 200. Id. 
 201. See, e.g., Escalante–Orozco, 386 P.3d at 828-29; State v. Hulsey, 408 P.3d 408 (Ariz. 2018); 
State v. Rushing, 404 P.3d 240 (Ariz. 2017), petition for cert. docketed (U.S. April 19, 2018). 
 202. See State v. Burns, 344 P.3d 303, 325 (Ariz. 2015); State v. Benson, 307 P.3d 19, 30 (Ariz. 
2013); Boyston, 298 P.3d at 901; State v. Hardy, 283 P.3d 12, 24 (Ariz. 2012); State v. Cota, 272 P.3d 
1027, 1042 (Ariz. 2012); Hargrave, 234 P.3d at 582-83; State v. Chappel, 236 P.3d 1176, 1184-85 (Ariz. 
2010); State v. Dann, 207 P.3d 604, 617 (Ariz. 2009); Cruz, 181 P.3d at 213. 
 203. See State v. Reeves, 310 P.3d 970, 976 (Ariz. 2013); State v. Prince, 250 P.3d 1145, 1160 
(Ariz. 2011); State v. Womble, 235 P.3d 244, 253 (Ariz. 2010); see also State v. Hausner, 280 P.3d 604, 
631 (Ariz. 2012) (however, Dale Hausner committed suicide in prison on June 19, 2013). 
 204. See Strickland v. Wash., 466 U.S. 668, 675 (1984) (examining the effectiveness of counsel at 
the sentencing proceeding). 
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death row prisoners to gain post-conviction relief.205  Miller created a new 
interpretation of constitutional law.206  Lynch III upheld an interpretation of 
constitutional law existing since the Simmons decision in 1994,207 and 
reversed the incorrect application of constitutional law by Arizona’s 
Supreme Court going back in a string of cases to at least Cruz in 2008.208  
Post-conviction relief is always available to prisoners whose sentence 
violates the United States Constitution.209  Unlike with juvenile offenders 
sentenced to life in prison, it remains to be seen whether death row 
prisoners denied due process during sentencing can be precluded from 
having their convictions resentenced by a legislative fix reinstating parole 
for first degree murder.210  In 2016, Lynch’s case went again before the 
Arizona Supreme Court on two issues: (1) whether a Simmons error is 
subject to harmless-error analysis and, if so, (2) whether the Simmons error 
was harmless.211  However, the court dismissed the case after Lynch died in 
prison on November 4, 2017.212 
Arizona death row inmates are already using Lynch III to secure new 
sentences.213  A jury sentenced Joel Randu Escalante–Orozco to death for 
first degree murder, sexual assault, and first-degree burglary which occurred 
in 2001.214  At trial, Escalante–Orozco objected to the jury instructions, 
arguing that the jurors should not consider his potential for release when 
 
 205. See Lynch III, 136 S. Ct. at 1820 (discussing that the Arizona Supreme Court confirmed that 
parole was unavailable to Lynch under its law, while Simmons and its progeny established Lynch’s right 
to inform his jury of that fact). 
 206. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 724 (2016) (noting that Miller announced a 
substantive rule of constitutional law after analyzing that the vast majority of juvenile offenders faced a 
punishment that the law could not oppose on them). 
 207. See Garza v. Ryan, No. CV-14-01901-PHX-SRB, 2017 WL 105983, at *3 (D. Ariz. Jan. 11, 
2017) (noting that “[Lynch III] does not represent a change in the law. It simply applies existing law to 
an Arizona case.”). 
 208. See, e.g., Cruz, 181 P.3d 196; Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  Before the Arizona 
Supreme Court’s Cruz decision in 2008, the Court considered Simmons inapposite, as  “[i]t involved a 
sentencing jury . . . [i]n Arizona, the trial judge determines punishment.” State v. Mott, 931 P.2d 1046, 
1057 (Ariz. 1997).  Juries started determining punishment in murder cases only after the Supreme Court 
held Arizona’s capital sentencing statute unconstitutional in Ring v. Arizona and the legislature granted 
the jury, not the judge, the responsibility in determining whether to sentence a defendant to death or life 
in prison. See 2002 Ariz. Legis. Serv. 5th Sp. Sess. Ch. 1 (S.B. 1001) (West). 
 209. ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(a). 
 210. See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736 (suggesting that a “State may remedy a Miller violation 
by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by resentencing 
them.”). 
 211. See Appellant’s Supplemental Brief Regarding Harmless Error at 3, State v. Lynch (Lynch 
IV) (Ariz. Sept. 30, 2016) (No. CR-12-0359-AP) (on file at the Arizona Supreme Court). 
 212. See Dismissal Order, Lynch IV (Ariz. Nov. 13, 2017) (No. CR-12-0359-AP) (on file at the 
Arizona Supreme Court). 
 213. See generally Escalante–Orozco, 386 P.3d 798 (depicting a recent case using Lynch III to 
secure a new sentence). 
 214. Id. at 809. 
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deciding whether to impose the death penalty.215  “The trial court denied the 
objection and refused the requested instruction because it speculated about 
the future availability of parole.”216  The court found that “the prosecutor 
did not have to explicitly argue future dangerousness for it to be an 
issue.”217  The prosecutor made future dangerousness an issue by 
introducing evidence that Escalante–Orozco attacked his wife on two 
previous occasions.218  The court relied on Lynch III and held that the trial 
court must conduct new penalty phase proceedings, reasoning that even if 
the error was harmless, the state did not prove “‘beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the error did not contribute to or affect the verdict or sentence.’”219 
B.  Opportunity to be Heard Protected by Due Process 
Prisoners sentenced to life with the possibility of parole can have a 
recognized right to appear before a parole board under the due process 
clause of the United States Constitution.220  While there is no inherent right 
to parole, a state can create a recognized liberty interest by statute, requiring 
due process.221  Minimal due process includes an opportunity to be heard.222  
Arizona’s parole statue grants a recognized liberty interest in parole, 
protected by the due process clause.223  Accordingly, the Board of Executive 
Clemency “must afford Arizona inmates who become eligible for parole an 
‘opportunity to be heard.’”224  As written, Arizona’s parole eligibility statute 
only applies to a “person who commits a felony offense before January 1, 
1994,” or a juvenile offender sentenced to life imprisonment.225  However, 
since 1994 the Arizona judiciary has sentenced more than two hundred 
defendants to life imprisonment with a possibility of parole after twenty-
five or thirty-five years.226  Many of these prisoners are sentenced under 
section 13-751 of the Arizona Revised Statute, which grants the sentencing 
judge discretion in sentencing a defendant to either life or natural life.227  
 
 215. Id. at 828. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. at 829. 
 218. Escalante-Orozco, 386 P.3d at 829. 
 219. Id. at 830. 
 220. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 5. 
 221. Id. at 7, 12. 
 222. Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 220 (2011) (“[A] prisoner subject to a parole statute . . . 
received adequate process when he was allowed an opportunity to be heard and was provided a 
statement of the reasons why parole was denied.”). 
 223. Stewart, 753 P.2d at 1199. 
 224. Ariz. Attorney Gen. Op. No. 14-007 (Oct. 3 2014) at 3. 
 225. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1604.09(I). 
 226. List of defendants generated with information provided by the Arizona Department of 
Corrections (on file with author). 
 227. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-751(A)(2). 
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Other prisoners are sentenced under section 13-1003(D) of the Arizona 
Revised Statute, which allows for no discretion and mandates a twenty-five 
to life sentence.228 
The issue remains whether defendants sentenced to life imprisonment 
with a possibility of parole after twenty-five years for crimes committed 
after 1994 are eligible for parole, which would entitle them to due process 
protections, including the opportunity to be heard by a parole board.229  To 
determine if the defendants are eligible for parole one must first determine 
if a sentence with a possibility of parole after twenty-five years is a lawful 
or unlawful sentence.230  Under Arizona law, “[a] trial court has no inherent 
power to change a sentence already lawfully imposed.”231  “An unlawful 
sentence is one that is outside the statutory range.”232  If life imprisonment 
with a possibility of parole after twenty-five years is a valid sentence for the 
trial judge to impose, then the ex post facto alteration of that sentence denies 
the due process right to a parole hearing and violates the prisoner’s rights 
under the double jeopardy clause by increasing a lawfully imposed 
sentence.233  In Arizona, “[o]nce a defendant begins to serve a lawful 
sentence, he may not be sentenced to an increased term.  To do so violates 
the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy.”234  This includes a 
defendant’s parole eligibility since, “parole eligibility is a function of the 
length of the sentence fixed by the [court].”235  A sentence of life 
imprisonment with a possibility of parole after twenty-five years for a crime 
committed after 1994 should be considered a lawful sentence because the 
sentence has been continuously imposed in the same manner under the exact 
 
 228. Id. § 13-1003(D). 
 229. See generally Ariz. Attorney Gen. Op. No. 14-007 (Oct. 3, 2014) (describing the due process 
protection to be heard by the parole board). 
 230. State v. Suniga, 701 P.2d 1197, 1201 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985). 
 231. Id.; see State v. Falkner, 542 P.2d 404, 406 (Ariz. 1975) (holding the trial court does not have 
inherent power to modify a sentence); cf. State v. Powers, 742 P.2d 792, 796 (Ariz. 1987) (“[T]rial court 
apparently overlooked its statutory duty to impose a felony assessment.  Because the court was required 
to impose the assessment, its initial sentence was unlawful under the statute and it could correct the 
sentence to reflect the felony assessment without violating the prohibition against double jeopardy.”). 
 232. State v. House, 821 P.2d 233, 234 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991). 
 233. See Suniga, 701 P.2d at 1203 (showing that alteration of an already imposed life sentence is a 
violation of double jeopardy). 
 234. Id.; see Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163, 168 (1873). 
 235. Warden, Lewisburg Penitentiary v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653, 658 (1974); see United States v. 
Paskow, 11 F.3d 873, 879 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[P]arole eligibility is part of the sentence for the underlying 
offense, its terms and conditions are fixed at the moment the underlying offense is complete.  Therefore, 
like the length of a term of incarceration, the conditions affecting parole eligibility cannot be 
retrospectively altered.”); Lynch II, 357 P.3d at 126 (“Parole eligibility is not a right that can be waived.  
To the contrary, the eligibility decision is within the trial court’s discretion.”); Benson, 307 P.3d at 32 
(“Section 13-751(A) does not confer a ‘right’ to parole eligibility on defendants.  Indeed, the statute’s 
plain language leaves the eligibility decision squarely within the trial court’s discretion.”). 
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same sentencing statutes going back to 1978.  The situation is demonstrated 
clearest by Arizona’s conspiracy to commit murder sentence.236 
Since 1978, under Arizona’s conspiracy statute, the proper sentence is 
life without possibility of parole for twenty-five years.237  In 1993, the court 
found in State v. Milke that section 13-1003(D) of the Arizona Revised 
Statute seemed clear and unambiguous.238  In Milke, the defendant “was 
convicted of conspiracy to commit first degree murder.”239  The conspiracy 
statute provides that “‘[c]onspiracy to commit a class 1 felony is punishable 
by a sentence of life without possibility of release [for] 25 years.’”240  The 
court found the language of section 13-1003(D) of the Arizona Revised 
Statute is “precise, unambiguous, and leaves no room for interpretation.”241  
The trial court imposed “a concurrent life sentence without possibility of 
parole for 25 years for conspiracy[.]”242  The court reasoned that the 
sentence imposed by the trial court on the conspiracy count was proper.243 
Under Arizona’s conspiracy statute, the proper sentence is life without 
possibility of parole for twenty-five years, even if the crime occurred after 
1994.244  In State v. Anderson,245 the court sentenced Frank Anderson for 
murder, armed robbery, and conspiracy occurring in 1996.246  The court 
sentenced Anderson to “life imprisonment without the possibility of parole 
for twenty-five years for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder[.]”247  
Upholding the sentence, the Arizona Supreme Court reasoned that “the 
sentence imposed for the conspiracy conviction—life imprisonment without 
the possibility of parole for twenty-five years—was authorized without any 
finding of aggravating circumstances.”248 
Section 13-1003(D) of the Arizona Revised Statute, last amended in 
1978, provides a mandatory indeterminate life sentence for defendants 
 
 236. See generally ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1003(D) (indicating the length of imprisonment 
for conspiracy to commit a felony). 
 237. See, e.g., Date v. Schriro, 619 F. Supp. 2d 736 (D. Ariz. 2008) (2000 conspiracy); State v. 
Milke, 865 P.2d 779 (Ariz. 1993) (1989 murder & conspiracy); State v. Bigger 254 P.3d 1142 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 2011) (2002 murder & conspiracy); State v. Robles, 901 P.2d 1200 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (1991 
conspiracy). 
 238. Milke, 865 P.2d at 791. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1003(D) (1993)). 
 241. Id. (citing State v. Reynolds, 823 P.2d 681, 682 (Ariz. 1992)) (“If a statute’s language is clear 
and unambiguous, the court will give it effect without resorting to other rules of statutory construction.” 
(citing State v. Arnett, 579 P.2d. 542, 555 (1978))). 
 242. Id. at 782 (emphasis added). 
 243. Milke, 865 P.2d at 791. 
 244. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1003(D). 
 245. 111 P.3d 369 (2005). 
 246. Id. at 377. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. at 401. 
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convicted of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder.249  It is an 
indeterminate sentence, with the court fixing the minimum and maximum 
term, in these cases a twenty-five (or thirty-five) year minimum and a 
maximum life term, but a parole board determines at what precise point 
between the minimum and maximum that the prisoner is ready for 
release.250  The court, in both Milke and Anderson, imposed identical 
sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for twenty-
five years for conspiracy to commit first degree murder.251  At first, this 
situation appears to conflict with section 41-1604.09(I) of the Arizona 
Revised Statute, which only applies parole eligibility to a “person who 
commits a felony offense before January 1, 1994,” or juvenile offenders 
sentenced to life imprisonment.252  However, if a sentence of life without 
possibility of parole for twenty-five years is a lawful sentence, then the 
State of Arizona concedes that there is a recognized liberty interest in parole 
protected by due process.253  Failing to honor the sentence with parole 
eligibility imposed by the trial court in cases like Anderson would result in 
the increase of a sentence from one with parole, to a sentence without 
parole.  The Supreme Court of the United States previously held that “life 
without parole is ‘the second most severe penalty permitted by law,’ . . . 
[and] share[s] some characteristics with death sentences that are shared by 
no other sentences.”254  Additionally, any alternative interpretation would 
lead to an indeterminate sentence without parole, a concept not 
contemplated by the Arizona legislature or any legislature before in 
American penal history,255 and in fact is the opposite of the legislation’s 
apparent purpose.256  Finally, the Arizona Supreme Court held in 2008 that 
no state law prohibits a defendant’s release on parole after serving twenty-
five years, 257 referring to section 13-751 of the Arizona Revised Statute, a 
statute that provides for the possibility of the same sentence as section 13-
 
 249. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1003(D); see Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 116 (1991). 
 250. See LAROE, supra note 43. 
 251. Milke, 865 P.2d at 790; Anderson, 111 P.3d at 377. 
 252. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1604.09(I). 
 253. Stewart, P.2d at 1199; Ariz. Attorney Gen. Op. No. 14-007 (Oct. 3, 2014). 
 254. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 69, (2010) (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 
1001 (1991)). 
 255. See Phoenix v. Superior Court, 696 P.2d 724, 729 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985)(“The courts will 
avoid statutory interpretations that lead to absurd results which could not have been contemplated by the 
legislature.”). 
 256. See Vera, 334 P.3d at 760 (“[I]n imposing a sentence of ‘life without parole for twenty-five 
(25) years,’ the court clearly believed this alternative sentence would provide Vera with a meaningful 
opportunity of release . . . .”). 
 257. Cruz, 181 P.3d at 207 (citing A.R.S. § 13–703(A) (2004), renumbered as § 13-751 in 2009). 
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1003(D).258  Regarding a murder in the year 2000 under the same statute the 
Court: 
conclude[d] the statute is equally clear that the legislature intended 
to provide one sentencing option for persons convicted of first-
degree murder other than death: a life term of imprisonment.  The 
legislature gave trial judges the discretion to choose alternative 
conditions for that life term—natural life or life with the possibility 
of parole in twenty-five or thirty-five years[.]259 
Therefore, it seems clear that a sentence with a parole possibility after 
twenty-five years is a valid sentence, entitling prisoners thus sentenced a 
guaranteed due process right to a parole hearing.  Any statute to the contrary 
is unconstitutional under the due process clause. 
Even if a sentence is unlawful, unless the original sentence is vacated, 
the trial court can only correct the sentence within “60 days of the entry of 
judgment and sentence” but before the defendant’s appeal, if any, is 
perfected.260  The state must appeal (or cross-appeal) in order to challenge 
an illegally lenient sentence otherwise the court has no subject matter 
jurisdiction to alter such a sentence.261  However, on a number of occasions 
the Arizona appellate courts appear to be acting without lawful 
jurisdiction.262  When a sentence is vacated, “the court may not impose a 
sentence for the same offense . . . which is more severe than the earlier 
sentence unless . . . the earlier sentence was unlawful and it is corrected so 
the court may impose a lawful sentence.”263  Nor is there precedent that the 
court is required to vacate a sentence just because it is unlawful.  In an 
ineffective assistance of counsel case, the Arizona Supreme Court held that 
“[a]lthough defendant was improperly advised that he was statutorily 
entitled to parole eligibility in 25 years, this error is harmless because he 
actually received the illegally lenient sentence promised.”264  Finally, if a 
sentence is unlawful, an ex post facto alteration of the sentence by amending 
 
 258. Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1003(D) ( which says, “punishable by a sentence of 
life imprisonment without possibility of release on any basis until the service of twenty-five years . . . 
.”), with ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-751(A)(3) (which says, “If the defendant is sentenced to life, the 
defendant shall not be released on any basis until the completion of the service of twenty-five calendar 
years . . . .”). 
 259. Fell, 97 P.3d at 912, aff’d, 115 P.3d 594 (Ariz. 2005) (emphasis added). 
 260. ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 24.3. 
 261. State v. Dawson, 792 P.2d 741, 749 (Ariz. 1990) (holding that the court will not correct 
sentencing errors that benefit a defendant, in the context of his own appeal, absent a proper appeal or 
cross-appeal by the state). 
 262. See, e.g., Godinez, 2013 WL 3788427, at *14; State v. Schwartz, No. 2 CA-CR 2006-0213, 
2008 WL 4516336, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2008). 
 263. ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 26.14. 
 264. State v. Kinslow, 799 P.2d 844, 848 (Ariz. 1990). 
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the minute entry is inappropriate.265  Considering the large number of cases 
with defendants sentenced to a specific parole eligibility state, if the 
sentences are held unlawful, the courts should also follow the precedent that 
“[a] sentence that is ‘so ambiguous that it fails to reveal its meaning ‘with 
fair certainty,’’ is illegal.”266  Regardless of the sentence’s lawfulness, the 
government cannot seek the death penalty on resentencing from a life 
sentence,267 and if a prisoner is released on parole, the government is 
estopped from re-incarcerating an erroneously released prisoner.268 
C.  When the Absence of Parole Voids Plea Deals 
Arizona’s indeterminate sentencing scheme is also problematic for 
defendants whose plea agreements specify parole eligibility, if parole does 
not exist.269  “‘Plea agreements are contractual in nature and subject to 
contract interpretation.’”270  Ambiguities in the terms of the plea agreement 
are construed against the government, “in light of the parties’ respective 
 
 265. See State v. Bowles, 841 P.2d 209 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that when there is 
discrepancy between oral pronouncement of sentence and minute entry that cannot be resolved by 
reference to the record, remand for re-clarification of sentence is appropriate); cf. State v. Heri, No. 1 
CA–CR 11–0612, 2012 WL 3761561, *2 (Ariz. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2012) (“It is clear that the trial court 
was sentencing Heri to life in prison with the possibility of parole after 35 years.  To avoid any possible 
ambiguity, we hereby order that the formal sentence be clarified to be life in prison with possibility of 
parole after 35 years.”). (2007 murder) (emphasis added). 
 266. See United States v. Contreras-Subias, 13 F.3d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1994) (requiring 
defendant to serve the sentence both concurrently and consecutively to another federal sentence was so 
ambiguous as to be illegal). 
 267. See Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203 (1984) (considering a sentence of life imprisonment an 
acquittal of the death sentence for the purpose of the double jeopardy clause). 
 268. See Johnson v. Williford, 682 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1982) (where a prisoner had been led to 
believe he was to be eligible for parole at the time that he was released); see also United States v. 
Merritt, 478 F. Supp. 804, 807 (D.D.C. 1979) (recognizing, that in some cases, “fundamental principles 
of liberty and justice,” would be violated if a person were required to serve the remainder of a prison 
sentence after he had been released prematurely from custody through no fault of his own, and had made 
a good adjustment to society). 
 269. See State v. Rosario, 987 P.2d 226, 230 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999) (stating that Rosario committed 
his crimes after the date on which the legislature enacted laws eliminating the possibility of parole for 
crimes committed after that date, but Rosario’s plea agreement provided that he would not be eligible for 
release from confinement until serving at least one-half the sentence imposed by the court.). 
 270. State v. Rivera, 109 P.3d 83, 88 (Ariz. 2005) (citing Coy v. Fields, 27 P.3d 799, 802 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 2001); see United States v. Frownfelter, 626 F.3d 549, 555-56 (10th Cir. 2010) (applying the 
contract law principle of mutual mistake of fact to evaluate a challenge to a guilty plea); United States v. 
Williams, 198 F.3d 988, 993 (7th Cir. 1999) (same); United States v. Johnson, 187 F.3d 1129, 1134 (9th 
Cir.1999) (“Plea agreements are contracts, and the government is held to the literal terms of the 
agreement.”); United States v. Standiford, 148 F.3d 864, 868 (7th Cir. 1998) (applying the contract law 
principle of condition subsequent to a challenge to a guilty plea); Margalli-Olvera v. Immigration and 
Naturalization Serv., 43 F.3d 345, 351 (8th Cir. 1994) (“Plea agreements are contractual in nature, and 
are interpreted according to general contract principles.” ); Brooks v. United States, 708 F.2d 1280, 1281 
(7th Cir. 1983) (“A plea bargain is, in law, just another contract.”); see generally John F. Gallagher, 
Criminal Law - Constitutional Contract - Courts Can Vacate Plea Agreements if State Proves Material 
Breach (State v. Rivest), 66 MARQ. L. REV. 193 (1982) (analyzing constitutional contract theory). 
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bargaining power and expertise.”271  One of the possible remedies for a 
breach in a plea agreement contract is specific performance.272  The state’s 
inability to provide the promised parole eligibility likely requires specific 
performance for the parole hearing, otherwise the plea agreement is likely 
void, thereby necessitating a new plea or trial.273 
1. Breach 
A guilty plea is void if it is induced by promises or threats which 
deprive it of the character of a voluntary act.274  When a defendant enters 
into a plea agreement, he waives his Sixth Amendment right to a jury 
trial.275  A defendant may not waive this constitutional right unless he does 
so knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.276  A plea does not qualify as 
intelligently accepted unless a criminal defendant first receives “‘real notice 
of the true nature of the charge against him, the first and most universally 
recognized requirement of due process.’”277  The defendant must also be 
advised by competent counsel, be in control of his mental faculties, and be 
made aware of the nature of the charges against him.278  A plea is 
voluntarily accepted if the defendant accepts with “an awareness of its 
ramifications, and to that end . . . is apprised of the range of sentence and 
the rights forfeited by a plea of guilty.”279  Before accepting a guilty plea in 
Arizona, a trial court must inform the defendant of the nature and “range of 
possible sentence for the offense to which” the plea is offered, including 
“any special conditions regarding sentencing, parole, or commutation 
imposed by statute.”280  If the record is silent, the burden shifts to the 
government to prove that the waiver was knowingly, voluntarily and 
intelligently made.281 
 
 271. United States v. De La Fuente, 8 F.3d 1333, 1338 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 272. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 263 (1971) (stating that the state court was in a 
better position to decide whether the circumstances required only that there be specific performance of 
the plea agreement ); see also Hovey v. Superior Court, 798 P.2d 416, 420 (Ariz. Ct. App., Div. 1 1990) 
(“Specific performance provides the only appropriate relief.”); State v. Georgeoff, 788 P.2d 1185, 1188 
(Ariz. 1990) (stating that a defendant may seek specific performance if he or she learns of a breach at or 
before sentencing ). 
 273. Hovey, 798 P.2d at 420. 
 274. Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1454 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Machibroda v. United 
States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962); Iaea v. Sunn, 800 F.2d 861, 866 (9th Cir. 1986)). 
 275. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 264. 
 276. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) (holding that the standard under which an 
accused has waived the right to counsel also applies to determining whether a guilty plea was voluntarily 
made). 
 277. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 618 (1998). 
 278. Id. at 619. 
 279. State v. Contreras, 542 P.2d 17, 19 (Ariz. 1975). 
 280. ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 17.2 (a)(1)-(2). 
 281. United States v. Pricepaul, 540 F.2d 417, 423 (9th Cir. 1976). 
32
Ohio Northern University Law Review, Vol. 44 [2019], Iss. 2, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.onu.edu/onu_law_review/vol44/iss2/3
2018] NO INDETERMINATE SENTENCING WITHOUT PAROLE 295 
If a defendant bases his decision to plead guilty upon his belief that he 
could be paroled at one-half of his incarceration terms, he has raised a 
colorable claim.282  Edward Rosario’s plea agreement provided “if 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment, the Defendant is not eligible for 
release from confinement on any basis until having served not less than one-
half the sentence imposed by the court.  Eligibility or release shall be 
determined by the Board of Pardons and Paroles.”283  However, Rosario 
committed his crimes after January 1, 1994 and is not eligible for parole 
under section 41-1604.09 of the Arizona Revised Statute.284  The court held 
that “[i]f Rosario based his decision to plead to the offenses based upon his 
belief that he could be paroled at one-half of his incarceration terms, he has 
raised a colorable claim.”285  The court reasoned that “‘[a] defendant is 
entitled to an evidentiary hearing when he presents a colorable claim, that is 
a claim which, if defendant’s allegations are true, might have changed the 
outcome.’”286 
A plea may be rendered involuntary not only if the court fails to 
adequately explain the material consequences of a guilty plea, but also if the 
state materially breaches the plea agreement.287  In 2010, Jesus Godinez 
pled guilty to two counts of first-degree murder and four counts of 
aggravated assault.288  The Court sentenced Godinez to two concurrent 
sentences of “life imprisonment with possibility of parole after 25 calendar 
years,” as indicated in the written plea agreement.289  During settlement, 
both defense counsel and the prosecutor “referred intermittently to the 
possibility of ‘release’ and ‘parole’ after twenty-five years, including 
references to possible appearances in front of the parole board.”290  Despite 
this, the trial court found “Godinez nonetheless was informed ‘correctly’ 
that he would be eligible for release.”291  The appellate court disagreed and 
remanded the case to determine if parole eligibility was material to 
Godinez’s decision to plead guilty.292 
 
 282. Rosario, 987 P.2d at 230; see State v. Agboghidi, No. 2 CA-CR 2013-0103-PR, 2013 WL 
1955858, at *2 (Ariz. Ct. App. May 13, 2013) (defendant arguing that the trial court erred in concluding 
that “he would have accepted the plea agreement even had he understood the distinction between 
commutation and parole.”). 
 283. Rosario, 987 P.2d at 230 (citing A.R.S. § 41-1604.09). 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. (citing Appeal in Yuma County Juvenile Action J-95-63, 902 P.2d 834 (Ariz. Ct. 
App.1995)); State v. Bryant, 650 P.2d 1280, 1281 (Ariz. Ct. App.1982). 
 286. Rosario, 987 P.2d at 230 (quoting State v. Watton, 793 P.2d 80, 85 (Ariz. 1990)). 
 287. State v. Ross, 804 P.2d 112, 116-17 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990). 
 288. Godinez, 2013 WL 3788427, at *1. 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. at *3. 
 292. Id. at *5. 
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While the courts in Rosario and Godinez require that the defendant 
would not have accepted the plea agreement if he had known that parole 
was not a real possibility, a defendant who is unaware he would not be 
parole eligible until he served his minimum sentence when he pled guilty, is 
prejudiced by his lack of understanding of the sentencing statute and the 
failure to inform him is reversible error.293  In cases like Godinez, the 
defendants are unaware they will never be parole eligible.294  Since the 
sentences contain provisions affecting the manner in which the sentence or 
date of parole is to be computed, a defendant who is not aware of the 
impossibility of parole should have his guilty plea vacated.295  Even if the 
state argues that the word parole should equate to “release,” if the defendant 
believed that parole referred to the statutory definition found under Arizona 
law then consensus ad idem is impossible and therefore there is no plea 
agreement.296 
2. Remedy 
Failure to provide a parole hearing after a defendant serves twenty-five 
years would constitute a breach of the plea agreement and entitle the 
defendant either to specific performance, or to have the sentence vacated.297  
Specific performance is desirable from a public policy perspective,298 and 
has legal precedence.299  Otherwise, vacating the plea agreement after 
serving twenty-five years in prison could possibly subject the defendant to a 
new indictment,300 and the state would then be left to attempt to retry a 
 
 293. State v. Dishong, 594 P.2d 84, 85 (Ariz. 1979); State v. Cuthbertson, 570 P.2d 1075, 1077 
(Ariz. 1977). 
 294. See, e.g., State v. Ware, No. 2 CA-CR 2015-0124-PR, 2015 WL 2131107 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
May 7, 2015) (stating that the defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole 
pursuant to a plea agreement); Sperberg, 2010 WL 4286203 (stating same statement as Ware). 
 295. See State v. Ellis, 572 P.2d 791, 795 (Ariz. 1977) (“If the sentence contains any provision 
that the defendant was not aware of, that affects the manner in which the sentence or date of parole is 
computed, either the guilty plea should be vacated or the case remanded to determine if the defendant 
was actually aware of the provision absent from the record.”); see also State v. Brock, 789 P.2d 390, 393 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (“[I]neligibility to earn release credits is a special condition regarding sentence 
imposed by statute, of which a defendant must be made aware under Rule 17.2(b), and not . . . merely a 
‘collateral matter’ of which a defendant need not be informed.”). 
 296. See Coy, 27 P.3d at 803 (holding the state accountable for knowing Arizona law when it 
negotiates, drafts, and enters into plea agreements); see also Raffles v. Wichelhaus, EWHC Exch. J19, 
(1864) 2 Hurl. & C. 906 (interpreting a contract against the Draftsmen). 
 297. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 263; see State v. Bloom, 669 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) 
(stating that flagrant violations of a plea agreement are never harmless error.). 
 298. See supra Part II. 
 299. See United States ex rel. Ferris v. Finkbeiner, 551 F.2d 185, 187 (7th Cir.1977) (“Since 
[Defendant] has substantially begun performing his side of the bargain, it would not be fair to vacate the 
plea and require him to go through the procedure anew.  Fundamental fairness can be had by limiting his 
term of custody to that portion of the sentence which comports with the bargain made.”). 
 300. See United States v. Moulder, 141 F.3d 568, 572 (5th Cir. 1998) (applying the frustration of 
purpose doctrine to permit the government to re-indict the defendant); United States v. Bunner, 134 F.3d 
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twenty-five year old murder case.301  However, if the Arizona Legislature 
remedies the appropriate statutes and grants parole eligibility to all prisoners 
sentenced to indeterminate life sentences, the state will not be in breach of 
its plea agreements.302 
A court can order specific performance on a plea agreement, even if the 
sentence would be otherwise unlawful.303  In Buckley v. Terhune, the 
defendant entered into a plea agreement believing he was being sentenced to 
a maximum of fifteen years in prison for second degree murder, but was 
subsequently sentenced to a prison term of fifteen years to life, the 
mandatory term for the offense.304  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that the agreement had been breached and that specific performance was the 
only viable remedy because the defendant had already fulfilled his 
obligations under the plea agreement, including testifying against his co-
defendants, and serving his bargained-for sentence of fifteen years.305  In 
granting habeas relief, the court noted that it had arrived at its decision 
“notwithstanding the state’s argument that a determinate fifteen year prison 
term is not a lawful sentence for second degree murder.”306  It also noted 
that, “[c]onsistent or not with the state’s sentencing statute . . . [the 
defendant] has fulfilled his promises and it is now too late for the state to 
argue that it was not in a position to offer him a fifteen year sentence in 
exchange.”307 
 
1000, 1004 (10th Cir. 1998) (same).  But see United States v. Gaither, 926 F. Supp. 50, 52 (M.D. Pa. 
1996) (holding that while the defendant’s challenge to his guilty plea was like the application of the 
impracticability doctrine, the government was not free to re-indict); see also DiCesare v. United States, 
646 F. Supp. 544, 546-48 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (holding that the government could not re-indict the 
defendant because the defendant’s successful habeas corpus challenge to conviction did not amount to a 
breach of the agreement). 
 301. See e.g., Echols v. State, 373 S.W.3d 892, 902 (Ark. 2010); Gavin Lesnick, Plea Reached in 
West Memphis Murders, ARK. ONLINE (Aug. 19, 2011, 2:46 PM), 
http://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2011/aug/19/breaking-plea-reached-west-memphis-
murders/?breaking (after sixteen years in prison, convicted murderer released on time-served plea after 
state supreme court reversed conviction). 
 302. Ramirez v. Autosport, 440 A.2d 1345, 1349 (N.J. 1982) (“Within the time set for 
performance in the contract, the seller’s right to cure is unconditional.”). 
 303. See Buckley v. Terhune, 441 F.3d 688, 694 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that the trial court failed 
to “fulfill petitioner’s reasonable understanding of the plea agreement . . . .”); see also Palermo v. 
Warden, Green Haven State Prison, 545 F.2d 286, 296 (2d Cir.1976) (holding that under Santobello, 
unauthorized prosecutorial promise of parole for prior offense was entitled to specific performance).  But 
see Craig v. People, 986 P.2d 951, 959 (Colo.1999) (holding that plea agreement calling for an illegal 
sentence invalidated the guilty plea and could not be specifically enforced). 
 304. Buckley, 441 F.3d at 691-93. 
 305. Id. at 699. 
 306. Id. 
 307. Id. 
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It is also possible for the court to order the defendant released from 
prison at the end of the sentence for which the defendant bargained for.308  
In Rodriguez v. United States, after the defendant’s plea was vacated due to 
a change in law, the district court denied the government’s motion to restore 
the original indictment.309  The court reasoned that the parties cannot be 
restored to their positions prior to the plea agreement.310  The court further 
reasoned that “the restoration of the former indictment would have the 
effect of conferring upon the Government the sizable benefit of Rodriguez’s 
incarceration without obligating the Government to provide anything in 
return, a scenario the Court finds to be impermissible.”311 
A defendant who pleas guilty in exchange for parole eligibility after 
twenty-five years may be entitled to release after twenty-five years.312  If the 
defendant is given reasonable reason to believe that twenty-five years was 
the maximum sentence pled to, then under Buckley, that defendant should 
be ordered released from prison, for the defendant would have upheld his 
part of the contract.313  However, if a defendant is denied a parole hearing, it 
is in the interest of both the state and the defendant for the court to order 
specific performance for the defendant to be heard by the parole board.314  
Specific performance is in accordance with the public policy goal of parole, 
even if it might be contrary to statutory text.315  Specific performance also 
prevents the state from unduly benefiting from the defendants twenty-five 
years of imprisonment if the defendant is allowed to withdraw but the state 
is permitted to re-indict.316  Finally, specific performance puts both the 
government and the defendant in the position they believed they were in 
when the plea was originally negotiated.317  All of these remedies will be 
moot if the legislature fixes the unintended vagueness of the indeterminate 
sentencing statutes and authorizes those prisoners to be parole eligible with 
a statutory fix similar to the one used to make juvenile defendants parole 
eligible. 
 
 308. See Rodriguez v. United States, 933 F. Supp. 279, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (denying the 
Government’s motion to restore the original indictment). 
 309. Id. at 280-83. 
 310. Id. at 283. 
 311. Id. 
 312. See Buckley, 441 F.3d at 692. (Buckley pleading guilty in exchange for a lesser sentence of a 
maximum of fifteen years). 
 313. Id. at 699. 
 314. See id. at 702 n.11 (noting that in a case in which the state has already received the benefit of 
the bargain, the harm caused by its breach is generally best repaired by specific performance of the plea 
agreement). 
 315. United Steelworkers, Etc. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 194 (1979).  It is a familiar rule, that a 
thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, 
nor within the intention of its makers. See id. 
 316. Rodriguez, 933 F. Supp. at 283. 
 317. Id. 
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V.  ARIZONA’S INDETERMINATE SENTENCING LAWS ARE 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE 
Neither the Arizona executive nor the judicial branch have been able to 
establish the consequences for a criminal defendant sentenced to “life with 
the possibility of release.” 
The Due Process Clause requires a criminal statute “give adequate 
guidance to those who would be law-abiding, to advise defendants of the 
nature of the offense with which they are charged, or to guide courts in 
trying those who are accused.”318  Therefore, a criminal sentencing scheme 
can be challenged on vagueness grounds, and the scheme is void for 
vagueness if it fails to state with “sufficient clarity the consequences of 
violating a given criminal statute.”319  Any statute can be found 
unconstitutionally vague if it does not provide persons of ordinary 
intelligence reasonable notice of prohibited behavior and if it “fails to 
provide explicit standards for those who apply it,” allowing for arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement.320  The Arizona judicial and executive 
branches have offered conflicting and contradictory interpretations of 
whether inmates sentenced to “life with parole” or “life with release” are 
actually entitled to parole and therefore any statute that provides for these 
sentences are unconstitutional and must be voided for vagueness.321 
A statute that provides two conflicting penalties for the same conduct is 
unconstitutionally vague.322  In 2000, Arizona’s stalking statute punished 
indistinguishable conduct as both a class three and as a class five felony.323  
In Anderson, the court held the stalking statute unconstitutionally vague.324  
The court further held that, “[w]here a statute is subject to more than one 
interpretation, the rule of lenity requires that doubts be resolved in favor of 
the defendant and against imposing the harsher punishment.”325 
A statutory scheme providing for mandatory lifetime parole and 
conviction, that does not provide a penalty for violation of parole, is 
unconstitutionally vague and violates separation of powers.326  In State v. 
 
 318. Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95, 97 (1948). 
 319. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979). 
 320. State v. Tocco, 750 P.2d 874, 876 (Ariz. 1988) (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 
104, 108–09 (1972)). 
 321. See State v. Anderson, 16 P.3d 214, 220 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) (noting that Arizona Revised 
Statute § 13-2923 is unconstitutionally vague); see also Wagstaff, 794 P.2d at 125 (noting that the Court 
is left the task of interpreting a vague penalty provision without any reasonably alternatives from which 
to choose). 
 322. Anderson, 16 P.3d at 220. 
 323. Id. 
 324. Id. 
 325. Id. (citing to Cawley v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 701 P.2d 1195, 1196 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1984)). 
 326. Wagstaff, 794 P.2d at 126. 
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Wagstaff, a criminal statute mandated, “that lifetime parole be imposed by 
the court as part of a convicted offender’s sentence.”327  The court found 
that the executive agencies are responsible “for executing the judgment and 
sentence as well as for determining the terms and conditions upon which 
parole may be granted.”328  The Court further found that, 
[b]y including a parole provision as part of the sentence but failing 
to state with sufficient clarity the consequences of violating a 
condition of the sentence, the legislature left the task of discerning 
those consequences to the judiciary.329  The task of resolving 
ambiguity and filling gaps in this statute goes beyond the proper 
judicial task of construing statutes.330 
The court held the statute providing for mandatory imposition of lifetime 
parole without fixing a penalty for violation of that part of the sentence 
violated the separation of powers.331  The court further held that “the statute 
creates the potential for conflict between the executive and judicial branches 
and places the judiciary in a constitutionally impermissible position.  By its 
very words, the statute gives power to both the courts and the Board of 
Pardons and Paroles to dictate different parole conditions.”332  The court 
reasoned that, “statutory language must be sufficiently definite so that those 
responsible for executing the law may do so in a rational and reasoned 
manner.”333 
Even Arizona’s high court has displayed confusion over whether or not 
the possibility of parole still exists after the 1994 statute.  In Wagner, the 
Arizona Supreme Court upheld Arizona’s capital sentencing statute after 
rejecting a void for vagueness challenge in the context of arbitrary judicial 
decision-making during sentencing proceedings; however, in doing so the 
court erroneously cited to previous versions of the statute that have been 
superseded by its current iteration.334  The defendant challenged his 
sentence of life without the possibility of parole under the void for 
vagueness doctrine, alleging the statute “does not provide sentencing 
guidelines for a judge to use in deciding whether to impose a life or a 
 
 327. Id. at 121. 
 328. Id. at 121-22. Recall that “parole eligibility is a function of the length of the sentence fixed by 
the [court].” Warden, 417 U.S. at 658. 
 329. Wagstaff, 794 P.2d at 126. 
 330. Id.  “[T]here are limits beyond which we cannot go in finding what [the legislature] has not 
put into so many words or in making certain what it has left undefined or too vague for reasonable 
assurance of its meaning.” United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483, 486 (1948)). 
 331. Wagstaff, 794 P.2d at 126. 
 332. Id. at 122. 
 333. Id. at 125. 
 334. State v. Wagner, 982 P.2d 270, 270 (Ariz. 1999). 
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natural life sentence and therefore permits arbitrary enforcement of the 
law.”335  Wagner committed the murder in 1994, when the applicable statute 
forbade the possibility for parole.336  Curiously, the Supreme Court’s 
Wagner opinion did not cite to the murder statute as it existed at the time of 
Wagner’s offense,337  and concluded that the statute “states with clarity that 
the punishment for committing first degree murder is either death, natural 
life, or life in prison with the possibility of parole.”338  The Wagner Court’s 
failure to accurately define the statutory range of punishment(s) someone 
faces for committing first degree murder is ironic in the face of a void 
vagueness challenge; if the statute is too vague for a state’s highest court to 
understand, then “a person of mere ordinary intelligence”339 will be unable 
to determine the meaning of the law. 
Confusion over the possibility of parole extends to the trial courts.  In 
2001, Justin Joyce pled guilty to first degree murder and received a sentence 
of life with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years.340  In 2003 the 
Arizona Department of Corrections informed Joyce that he was not parole 
eligible.341  Joyce’s sentencing Judge, Jeffrey A. Hotham, stated in a minute 
entry, “although currently not eligible for parole consideration, the 
Defendant will be eligible for parole consideration after serving twenty-five 
calendar years.”342  In response, the Department of Corrections sent a letter 
to Judge Hotham, stating that “there was no stated review for release from a 
Life sentence after twenty-five calendar years[.]  The [Arizona] Department 
of Correction has asked and has not yet received an opinion from the 
Attorney General’s Office on how to review and release this type of 
inmate.”343  Judge Hotham made it expressly clear that Joyce is eligible for 
a parole hearing in 2026, and “[t]rial judges ‘are presumed to know the law 
and to apply it in making their decisions.’”344 
 
 335. Id. at 271. 
 336. 1993 Ariz. Sess. Laws 745-46 (“If the court does not sentence the defendant to natural life, 
the defendant shall not be released on any basis until the completion of the service of twenty-five 
calendar years.”). 
 337. See generally Wagner, 982 P.2d 270.  Additionally, in a footnote in the opinion, the court 
quoted the 1988 version of the sentencing statute.  Compare Id. at 274 n.1 with 1988 Ariz. Sess. Laws 
455. 
 338. Wagner, 982 P.2d at 273 (emphasis added). 
 339. Id. 
 340. Docket Entry, State v. Joyce, (Ariz. Super. Ct., Maricopa Cty. Dec. 5, 2003). 
 341. Minute Entry, State v. Joyce, (Ariz. Super. Ct., Maricopa Cty. Dec. 5, 2003), 
http://www.courtminutes.maricopa.gov/docs/Criminal/122003/m1224317.pdf. 
 342. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 343. See Letter, supra note 182. 
 344. State v. Lee, 944 P.2d 1222, 1230 (Ariz. 1997) (quoting Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 
653 (1990)). 
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The conflict over parole eligibility received attention in the Arizona 
Republic on March 19, 2017.345  Within eleven days after the first article, 
the newspaper reported that the Arizona Department of Corrections had 
issued an update to its Department Order Manual for Inmate Release 
Eligibility.346  The updated order now includes “inmates who were 
sentenced to Life with a minimum number of years to serve (i.e., 25 or 35 
years)” as eligible for parole.347  A statement from the Arizona Governor’s 
Office said, “‘the intent is to provide additional clarity, not to modify 
existing statute.’”348  However the new order does not reflect the text of the 
Department of Correction’s authorizing statute.349  Nor does the order 
require the Board of Executive Clemency to grant a parole hearing under 
the Board’s authorizing statute.350  Instead of providing “additional clarity” 
the Board policy update deepens the uncertainty in whether parole is 
available and furthers the conflict between different parts of Arizona’ 
government. 
While the executive branch fails to offer clarity, the Arizona Supreme 
Court has a long history upholding a defendant’s parole eligibility when the 
statutes would suggest otherwise.351  As the Court recently indexed in 
Benson, where the defendant committed two murders in 2004, under section 
13-751, “Arizona law does not make Benson ineligible for parole.”352  
There are other occasions where this has been called into question.  Hardy 
committed murder in 2005, Cruz committed murder in 2003, and Hargrave 
committed murder in 2002.353  The court held that each of them could be 
eligible for parole, even though the statute these men were charged under 
provides for an ‘opportunity for release,’ and Arizona’s parole eligibility 
statute applies to a “person who commits a felony offense before January 1, 
1994.”354 
 
 345. See Generally, Michael Kiefer, supra note 13(stating that in 1994 Arizona replaced parole 
with a system that essentially forecloses parole eligibility). 
 346. Id. 
 347. ARIZ. DEP’T OF CORR., DEPARTMENT ORDER MANUAL: No. 1002, INMATE RELEASE 
ELIGIBILITY SYSTEM, at 2 (Apr. 10, 2017). 
 348. Michael Kiefer, supra note 13. 
 349. See generally ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41–1604.09. 
 350. See Id. § 31–412. 
 351. See generally Benson, 307 P.3d 19 (finding that Petitioner was eligible for parole). 
 352. Id. at 32 (citing ARIZ .REV .STAT. § 13–751(A)) (“Consequently, the trial court did not err by 
refusing to instruct the jury in accordance with Simmons (citing Hardy, 283 P.3d at 24)).  “Simmons 
instructions are not required when ‘[n]o state law . . . prohibit[s the defendant’s] release on parole.’” Id.  
(alterations in original) (citing Cruz, 181 P.3d at 207 (noting that, “[n]o state law would have prohibited 
Cruz’s release on parole after serving twenty-five years.”); see also Id (citing Hargrave, 234 P.3d at 
582–83 (“noting a Simmons instruction is not required even when a defendant is not likely to be released 
if given a life sentence.”). 
 353. Hardy, 283 P.3d at 16; see Cruz, 181 P.3d at 203; see also Hargrave, 234 P.3d at 575. 
 354. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41–1604.09. 
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With the understanding that ‘release’ includes ‘parole,’ Arizona’s 
murder statute should become clear, but conflict remains.  In a recent 2018 
federal district court Report and Recommendation, the magistrate judge 
found that a plain reading of Arizona’s first degree murder sentencing 
statute indicates that the types of release excluded from a natural life 
sentence (commutation, parole, work furlough, work release, or release 
from confinement) are not excluded from a sentence of life with 
“release.”355  The court concluded that it logically follows that “since these 
forms of release are not excluded, they are included.”356  Other Arizona 
statutes also indicate that ‘post-conviction release,’ means “parole, work 
furlough, community supervision, [and] probation[.]”357  But as the 
exchange between the trial judge and the Department of Corrections in the 
Joyce case shows, Arizona’s indeterminate sentencing system has put the 
executive and judicial branches into conflict.358  The judicial branch is 
sentencing defendants under the same laws that existed years before Truth-
in-Sentencing came into effect, and yet the Department of Corrections is 
given no statutory mechanism to review these parole eligible inmates.  If 
neither the life and natural life sentences of section 13-751 of the Arizona 
Revised Statute afford an opportunity for release, then the statute is 
providing two identical penalties for the same conduct.359  The confusion 
caused by Arizona’s indeterminate sentencing statutes is so great, that not 
only does its meaning evade people of “ordinary intelligence,” their 
interpretation has confused and befuddled Arizona’s highest court.  
Therefore, Arizona’s indeterminate sentencing statutes, sections 13–705, 
13-706, 13-751, and 13-1003, must be found unconstitutionally vague. 
VI.  RECOMMENDATION 
Arizona has already gone through a recent change in its laws relating to 
“life” sentences and parole eligibility.360  In 2012, the Supreme Court of the 
United States held that mandatory sentences of life without the possibility of 
parole are unconstitutional for juvenile offenders in Miller v. Alabama.361  
This ruling effectively makes Arizona’s capital sentencing statute 
 
 355. See Viramontes v. Ryan, CV-16-00151-TUC-RM, at 18 (D. Ariz. May 4, 2018) (Questioning 
“the propriety of sentencing a defendant to life with the possibility of “release” after 25 years without 
permitting any significant possibility of release.”). 
 356. Id. at 15. 
 357. Id. § 13-4401(for the purposes of Chapter 40) (emphasis added). 
 358. See Minute Entry, State v. Joyce, Ariz. Super. Ct., Maricopa Cty. (Dec. 5, 2003); see also 
Letter, supra note 182. 
 359. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-751. 
 360. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012). 
 361. Id. 
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unconstitutional when applied to juveniles.362  Therefore, in 2014, the 
Arizona legislature extended parole eligibility to juveniles serving life 
sentences in prison.363  This change keeps seventy-five convicted juvenile 
offenders in prison until they are given an opportunity to be heard by a 
parole board.364  If Arizona’s adult indeterminate sentences are overturned, 
then Arizona’s legislature will be forced again to amend the statute and give 
the defendants a mechanism to be heard by a parole board.  The legislature 
could preempt the resulting rush of litigation by amending the parole statute 
before the sentencing statutes are overturned.  This would have the effect of 
keeping the death sentences for capital defendants intact, saving the state 
from re-prosecuting old cases after the plea bargains are vacated and 
restoring Arizona’s indeterminate sentencing systems to their designed 
public interest purpose of rehabilitation and deterrence. 
 
 362. Vera, 334 P.3d 754, 759 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014); see State v. Valencia, 386 P.3d 392, 393 
(Ariz. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S.Ct. 467 (2017) (ongoing litigation regarding juvenile non-mandatory 
natural life sentences). 
 363. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13–716; see also Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 718 (determining 
that Miller is a new substantive constitutional rule that was retroactive on state collateral review). 
 364. Michael Kiefer, Arizona Supreme Court Reviews Life Sentences for Minors, AZCENTRAL 
(Dec. 23, 2016, 2:00 PM), http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/arizona/2016/12/23/arizona-court-
rule-sentencings-tucson-murder-cases-asdfa/95790448/. 
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